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Abstract
We combine data on trade, production, and input use to document five facts about
changes in the value added content of trade from 1970 to 2009. We find that the ratio
of value-added to gross exports fell by roughly 10 percentage points worldwide [Fact 1].
Across sectors, the ratio declined nearly 20 percentage points in manufacturing, but
rose in non-manufacturing sectors [Fact 2]. Across countries, declines range from 0 to
25 percentage points, with fast growing countries seeing larger declines [Fact 3]. Across
bilateral partners, declines are larger for nearby partners [Fact 4] and partners that
adopt regional trade agreements [Fact 5]. What driving forces underlie these changes?
Using a multi-sector structural gravity model with input-output linkages, we show that
changes in trade frictions play a dominant role in explaining all five facts.
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Recent decades have seen the emergence of global supply chains. Echoing Feenstra (1998),
rising trade integration has coincided with the simultaneous disintegration of production
across borders.1 As inputs pass through these global supply chains, they typically cross
borders multiple times. Since the national accounts record gross shipments across the border,
not the locations at which value is added at different stages of the production process,
conventional trade data obscure how value added – and the primary factors embodied therein
– is traded in the global economy. This means that gross trade data alone are not sufficient to
isolate the causes or interpret the consequences of the massive changes in the global economy
that have occurred in recent decades. We need to pierce the veil of the gross flows to analyze
changes in trade in value added directly.
This paper computes and analyzes the value added content of trade over the last four
decades (1970-2009). In doing so, we make three contributions. First, we provide long horizon
measures of value-added trade for a wide cross section of countries. Second, we document
five stylized facts about changes in value-added and gross trade at the world, country, and
bilateral level over time. We show that the value added content of trade has declined for
the world as a whole, that there is substantial heterogeneity in declines across countries,
and that regional trade agreements lower value-added relative to gross trade. Third, we
use a trade model with input-output linkages across sectors and countries to quantify the
role of international trade frictions in explaining the divergence between value-added and
gross trade over time. We show that changes in trade frictions, particularly frictions for
manufactured inputs, play a key role in explaining all five stylized facts.
To track value-added trade over time, we combine time series data on trade, produc-
tion, and input use to construct an annual sequence of global bilateral input-output tables
covering forty-two countries back to 1970. These synthetic tables track shipments of final
and intermediate goods both within and between countries. Using this framework, we com-
pute value-added exports: the amount of value added from a given source country that is
1This theme is reflected in work on vertical specialization, offshoring, and global value chains [Feenstra
and Hanson (1999), Yi (2003, 2010), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Antra`s (2016)].
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consumed in each destination (i.e., embodied in final goods absorbed in that destination)
[Johnson and Noguera (2012a)]. Value-added exports measure international transactions
in a manner consistent with commonly used value-added representations of production and
preferences.2 They differ from gross exports for several distinct reasons: exports are typically
produced using imported inputs, some exported inputs return home embodied in imports,
and exported inputs often are processed in third countries before being shipped onto their
final destination.
This data work builds on and extends an active literature on global input-output ac-
counting and trade in value added.3 Our data construction effort is distinguished from this
related work in that we provide a long historical perspective on the rise of global supply
chains, with broad country scope. In this, our work extends the pioneering long run analysis
of vertical specialization by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), who measured the import content
of exports for ten OECD countries from 1970 to 1990.4 The data that we compile span a
period of major structural changes in the global economy, including the rise of emerging
markets, the (re-)integration of Europe, and the spread of regional trade agreements. The
long panel dimension of our data is essential to credibly identify the impact of these events.
We summarize the most significant changes in value-added versus gross trade via five
stylized facts. The first fact is that the ratio of value-added to gross exports is declining over
time, by about ten percentage points over four decades [Fact 1]. Consistent with anecdotal
evidence, this decline has accelerated over time: the ratio of value-added to gross exports has
fallen roughly three times as fast since 1990 as it did from 1970 to 1990. This global decline
masks significant heterogeneity across sectors, countries, and bilateral partners. Across
sectors, the ratio of value-added to gross exports has fallen by almost twenty percentage
2On the production side, value-added exports are explicitly comparable to GDP. On the demand side,
value-added imports equal final expenditure on value added from foreign sources, regardless of whether that
value-added is embodied in domestic or imported final goods.
3See Daudin, Riﬄart and Schweisguth (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012a), Johnson (2014), Timmer
et al. (2014), Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014), Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015), and Kee and Tang (2016).
4It also complements related data sets, such as the World Input-Output Database, which cover the post-
1995 period only.
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points within manufacturing, but has risen outside manufacturing [Fact 2]. Across countries,
declines in value-added to gross exports range from near zero to over twenty-five percentage
points, and fast growing countries have seen larger declines on average [Fact 3].
Across bilateral partners, we show that both bilateral distance and adoption of bilateral
trade agreements predict changes in value-added to gross export ratios. In the time series,
distance is negatively correlated with changes in the bilateral ratio of value-added to gross
exports, so that the largest declines in value-added to export ratios are concentrated among
proximate trading partners [Fact 4]. We also find that adoption of regional trade agreements
(RTAs) is associated with declines in the ratio of bilateral value-added to gross exports [Fact
5]. For a typical agreement, the ratio of value-added to gross trade falls by five to eleven
percent. Further, deep trade agreements (e.g., customs unions or common markets) are
associated with larger declines in value-added to export ratios than shallow agreements.5
To isolate the driving forces underlying these changes, we interpret the five facts through
the lens of the workhorse structural gravity model, augmented to include input-output link-
ages across sectors and countries.6 There are two steps in this analysis. First, we use our
global input-output data, together with auxiliary data on prices of real value added and
final expenditure, to measure changes international trade frictions and sectoral expendi-
ture weights for final goods and inputs. Conditional on prices, the trade frictions influence
bilateral sourcing decisions for final goods and intermediate inputs, the final and input ex-
penditure weights govern the allocation of final and inputs expenditure across sectors.
Second, we analyze counterfactual model simulations to evaluate the role of trade frictions
in explaining changes in value-added versus gross trade.7 We show that declines in trade
5These findings contribute to an important literature on the impact of RTAs [Freund and Ornelas (2010)].
Despite the fact that many agreements were explicitly adopted to promote integration of supply chains across
borders, existing evidence on whether or how they have done so is scarce.
6Our model shares many similarities with recent multi-sector Ricardian models, which incorporate trade
in both final and intermediate inputs [Caliendo and Parro (2015), Levchenko and Zhang (2016), Eaton
et al. (forthcoming)]. Though we rely on Armington rather than Ricardian micro-foundations for trade, the
aggregate response of value-added trade to frictions would be similar in both models. In contrast to recent
Ricardian models, we allow differences in trade costs for final and intermediate goods to match imports of
final and intermediate goods separately within each sector.
7Our long horizon analysis complements Eaton et al. (forthcoming), who examine high frequency (business
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frictions over time play an important role in explaining all five stylized facts highlighted
above. Changes in other driving forces – including changes in productivity, factor supplies,
and sectoral expenditure weights – play a comparatively minor role. Among trade frictions,
declines in frictions for manufacturing goods, particularly manufactured inputs, are most
important for matching the data. We also show that declines in bilateral trade frictions
associated with RTA adoption explain changes in bilateral value-added to export ratios.
Moreover, the spread of RTAs over time can account for up to 15% of the global decline in
ratio of value-added to gross trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the procedure and data we use to mea-
sure value-added exports. Section 2 documents five stylized facts about differences between
gross and value-added exports. Section 3 presents the model, our quantification procedures,
and results on the role of trade frictions versus other forces in accounting for the five facts.
We analyze the role of trade frictions in detail in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1 Measuring Value-Added Exports Through Time
We begin by laying out the global input-output framework and procedure for computing
value-added exports, drawing on Johnson and Noguera (2012a). We then briefly discuss how
we combine sector-level production, input use, and trade data to implement the calculations,
with details provided in the Online Appendix.
1.1 Computing Value-Added Exports
Consider a world with N countries and S sectors at date t. Output in each sector and country
is produced using domestic primary factors (capital, labor, etc.) and intermediate inputs,
which may be sourced from home or abroad. Output is tradable in all sectors, and it may
be used to satisfy final demand (consumption, investment, and government expenditure) or
cycle) variation in trade frictions. Our results on the impact of regional trade agreements also complement
Caliendo and Parro (2015), who study North American integration.
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used as an intermediate input at home or abroad. The market clearing condition for gross
output produced by sector s in country i can be written as:
yit(s) =
∑
j
fijt(s) +
∑
j
∑
s′
mijt(s, s
′), (1)
where yit(s) is the value of output in sector s of country i, fijt(s) is the value of final goods
shipped from sector s in country i to country j, and mijt(s, s
′) is the value of intermediates
from sector s in country i used by sector s′ in country j.8
These market clearing conditions can be stacked to form the global input-output system.
We collect the total value of production in each sector in the S× 1 vector yit and shipments
of final goods from i to country j into S × 1 vectors fijt. Further, shipments of intermediate
inputs from i to country j are Aijtyjt, where Aijt is an S×S matrix with elements Aijt(s, s′) =
mijt(s, s
′)/yjt(s′). The S ×N market clearing conditions can then we written concisely as:
yt = (I−At)−1ft, (2)
where At is a block matrix with elements Aijt, yt is a block vector with elements yit, and
ft is a block vector with elements
∑
j fijt. The matrix (I −At)−1 is the Leontief Inverse of
the global input-output matrix: the product of the Leontief Inverse with any vector of final
goods returns the value of output from each country and sector that is required to produce
those final goods.
To compute value-added exports, we split ft into destination specific vectors f˜jt, where
f˜jt is the (SN × 1) vector of final goods absorbed in country j. Then (I − At)−1f˜jt is the
vector of output used directly and indirectly to produce final goods absorbed in country j.
The S × 1 block elements of (I −At)−1f˜jt – which we now denote yijt – record the output
from i used to produce final goods absorbed in j.
8In the data we use, we observe only the value of cross-border transactions, not quantities shipped.
Since markets implicitly clear in quantities, this means we are evaluating the underlying quantity flows at a
common set of prices to ensure that revenue for producers equals the value of expenditure across destinations.
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If the ratio of value-added to gross output in sector s of source country i is rit(s) =
1−∑j∑s′ Ajit(s′, s), then the amount of value added from sector s in country i embodied
in final goods absorbed in j is: vaijt(s) ≡ rit(s)yijt(s), where yijt(s) is an individual element
of yijt defined above. We refer to vaijt(s) as value-added exports.
1.2 Data
We combine data from the national accounts, commodity trade statistics, and benchmark
input-output tables to construct global input-output tables for each year between 1970 and
2009. We include forty-two OECD countries and major emerging markets, which account
for around 90% of world GDP. Remaining countries are aggregated into a ‘rest of the world’
composite.9 We include four composite sectors: (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing;
(2) non-manufacturing industrial production; (3) manufacturing; and (4) services.
Starting with macro-data on production and expenditure, we take annual GDP by com-
posite sector and GDP by expenditure category (i.e., final expenditure, exports, and im-
ports) from the UN National Accounts Database. Using the share of goods and services in
exports/imports from the IMF Balance of Payments statistics, we split exports/imports in
the GDP data into goods (sectors (1)-(3) above) and services.
To measure bilateral trade, we use data from the NBER-UN and CEPII BACI Databases.
For goods trade, we measure bilateral final and intermediate goods trade separately for each
of the three goods sectors. To do this, we assign disaggregated commodity codes in the
trade data to either final or intermediate use, based on the mapping from commodities to
national accounts end uses defined in the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) system. We
then aggregate commodities to match the composite sector definitions, using correspondences
between commodity and industry classifications. The result is a sector-level data set of cross-
country final and intermediate goods shipments from 1970 to the present.
9The countries in our sample (listed in the Online Appendix) account for roughly 80% of world GDP and
70-80% of world trade in the 1970-1990 period, rising to over 90% of GDP and 80-90% of world trade after
1990. Due to lack of data, we include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia in the
rest of the world during 1970’s and 1980’s.
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We turn to input-output tables for additional information on input use and sector-level fi-
nal expenditure. We take data for benchmark years from the OECD Input-Output Database
and IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Tables. Input-output tables are available for all forty-
two countries after 1995, for Asian countries from 1985, and ten major industrialized coun-
tries (the G7 plus Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands) from the 1970’s.
In combining these data, we face two challenges. First, there are discrepancies across
alternative data sources, both due to differences in definitions and measurement error. Sec-
ond, whereas the national accounts and trade data are annual, the input-output tables are
produced for benchmark years only, which are asynchronous across countries. To resolve
these issues, we prioritize the national accounts data and adjust the commodity trade data
in order to match the levels of aggregate trade in the national accounts. We then use a con-
strained least squares procedure to simultaneously adjust the input-output data to match
the annual production and trade data and extrapolate benchmark data to non-benchmark
years.
The result is a sector-level data set containing gross output (yit), value-added to output
ratios (rit(s)), final demand for domestic and imported goods (fiit and fIit), and domestic
and imported input use matrices (Aiit and AIit) for forty-two countries.
10 For goods imports
(s = {1, 2, 3}), we use observed bilateral final and intermediate import shares to split fIit(s)
and AIit(s, s
′) across sources. For the services sector, we apply a proportionality assumption;
we assume that bilateral import shares for final and intermediate services are the same and
equal to the share of each partner in multilateral services imports.
10Because we do not have production or input-output data for countries in the rest of the world, we
assume that all exports from the forty-two countries in our data to the rest of the world are absorbed there.
This assumption has little practical effect on measured value-added exports among countries in the sample
[Johnson and Noguera (2012b)].
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2 Changes in Value-Added vs. Gross Exports
Using the framework and data introduced above, we document five stylized time-series facts
regarding changes the ratio of value-added to gross exports over time. We start at the
multilateral level, documenting changes at the world, sector, and country level. We then
examine how proxies for bilateral trade frictions have shaped changes in bilateral value-
added versus gross exports. These serve as focal points in the model accounting analysis
that follows in Section 3.
2.1 World, Sector, and Country Changes
We start at the global level, plotting the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports for
the world as a whole in Figure 1. The ratio of value-added to gross exports declines by
0.08 including the ROW and 0.09 excluding the ROW from 1970-2009. Excluding the 2009
trade collapse, the value-added to export ratio declines by 0.11 including the ROW and by
0.13 excluding the ROW.11 This decline is spread unevenly over time. During the 1970-1989
interval, there is only a small net decline value added relative to gross exports, on the order
of a few percentage points. In contrast, value added relative to gross exports fall rapidly, by
8.5 (9.5 excluding the ROW) percentage points from 1990-2008. The decline in the value-
added to export ratio is roughly three times as fast during the 1990-2008 period as during
the pre-1990 period.
To drill down, we disaggregate these global trends along two dimensions, into changes in
value-added to export ratios at the sector level and across countries. We plot sector-level
changes in Figure 2. The headline result is that manufacturing is the only sector in which
the value-added to export ratio is falling over time. The ratio is increasing for agriculture
and services and stable in non-manufacturing industrial production.12
11Bems, Johnson and Yi (2010) point to the composition of changes in final expenditure during the 2009
recession to explain why value added rose relative to gross trade. When spending on final goods from sectors
with high degrees of vertical specialization (e.g., durable goods) falls, then the ratio of value-added to gross
exports rises.
12Note that the sector-level value-added to export ratio is not bounded by one. The reason is that each
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In Figure 3, we plot changes in value-added to export ratios at the country level. Panel
(a) of Figure 3 contains cumulative changes in the ratio of value-added to gross exports
from 1970-2008 at the country level. Nearly all countries experienced declines in the ratio
of value-added to gross exports, but the magnitude of the decline is heterogeneous across
countries. Most experience declines larger than 10 percentage points, though some large
and prominent countries (e.g., Japan, the UK, and Brazil) have smaller declines. Among
countries with large declines, one sees many emerging markets, but also some important
advanced economies (e.g., Germany).
To organize this cross-country variation, we plot the average annual change in the ratio
of value-added to gross exports against the average annual growth rate in real GDP in Panel
(b) of Figure 3. The correlation is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Cumulated over four decades, the point estimate implies that a country at the 90th percentile
of the growth distribution (5.8% per year) has a decline in the ratio of roughly 0.21 while
a country at the 10th percentile (2.2% per year) has a decline of 0.11. Because emerging
markets on average have higher growth than advanced countries, this also reinforces the
observation above that gross exports have risen more than value-added exports on average
for these countries.
2.2 Bilateral Trade Frictions
Shifting our focus to bilateral country pairs, we describe how changes in bilateral value-
added versus gross exports are shaped by bilateral trade frictions. We focus on two common
proxies for bilateral frictions: distance and regional trade agreements.
The Differential Burden of Distance We are interested in two main questions. First,
how do gross exports (xijt), value-added exports (vaijt), and value-added to export ratios
sector can export value added directly, embodied in gross exports from the sector, or it can export value
added indirectly, embodied in gross exports from other sectors. For example, non-manufacturing inputs are
used in production of manufactured goods, and hence non-manufacturing value added is indirectly exported
embodied in manufactures.
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(V AXijt ≡ vaijtxijt ) respond to bilateral distance? Second, how have these responses changed
over time?
To answer these questions, we estimate gravity-style regressions for each of the three
variables of interest:
log(yijt) = φ
y
it + φ
y
jt + β
y
t log(distij) + εijt, (3)
where yijt ∈ {xijt, vaijt, V AXijt}), {φyit, φyjt} are importer-year and exporter-year fixed ef-
fects and βyt is the time-varying coefficient on bilateral distance (distij) for outcome y.
For interpretation, it is useful to note that βV AX = βva − βx holds by construction, since
log(V AXijt) = log(vaijt)− log(xijt).
The distance coefficients estimated in Equation (3) are plotted in Figure 4.13 Looking at
the left panel, the ratio of value-added to gross exports is higher for more distant markets.
This is reflected in the separate distance coefficients for gross versus value-added exports
in the right panel. While distance depresses both, gross exports fall more strongly with
distance than do value-added exports – i.e., the absolute value of the distance coefficient
on gross exports is larger than the coefficient on value-added exports in all years. Further,
this differential impact of distance is strengthening over time. The distance coefficient for
the value-added to export ratio has risen from under 0.1 to 0.2. The reason is that distance
coefficient for gross exports has risen (in absolute value) over time, from roughly 0.9 to 1.1.14
13Very small bilateral gross trade flows are often lead to extreme value-added to export ratios, which
distort the point estimates and muddy inference. These outliers are mostly for emerging markets with low
quality data during the 1970-1985 period. We remove them by dropping bilateral flows less than one million
dollars and value-added to gross export ratios greater than ten.
14In the Online Appendix, we show that changes in these coefficients are robust to adding additional
gravity controls (e.g., indicators for common language, border, and colonial origin) and country-pair fixed
effects. Further, distance stands out among gravity variables in terms of its ability to explain changes in the
value-added to export ratio.
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Regional Trade Agreements We now examine how value-added and gross exports re-
spond to the adoption of regional trade agreements.15
To demonstrate the main result visually, we take an event study approach. We compare
the evolution of the value-added to export ratio for the treatment group of bilateral country
pairs that form new RTA’s during our sample to outcomes for a pair-specific control group
in a window surrounding adoption of the RTA. For country pair (i, j) that forms an RTA,
the control series is the bilateral value-added to export ratio for countries i and j vis-a`-vis
the set of countries with whom both i and j never form an RTA.16
We plot the resulting treatment and control series in Figure 5. Prior to RTA adoption,
value-added to export ratios are quite similar across the treatment and control groups. There
is then a strong divergence between the two, coinciding with adoption of the RTA: for pairs
that adopt an RTA, the value-added to export ratio drops sharply around the adoption date
and then continues to fall for roughly a decade thereafter. This divergence is prima facie
evidence that trade agreements have different effects on gross versus value-added trade.
To formalize these results and control for confounding factors, we turn to panel regressions
of the form:
log(yijt) = φ
y
it + φ
y
jt + φ
y
ij + β
yTradeAgreementijt + ε
y
ijt, (4)
where TradeAgreementijt is a collection of indicators for whether i and j are in a particular
trade agreement at time t and φyij is a country-pair fixed effect.
17 We consider several different
specifications for TradeAgreementijt. The first uses a single indicator for whether countries
15We use data on economic integration agreements assembled by Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand,
covering the 1960-2009 period [September 2015 Revision; http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/]. Our RTA
indicator takes the value one if a country pair has a free trade agreement or stronger.
16Formally, define Tt(i, j) =
vaijt+vajit
xijt+xjit
to be the bilateral value-added to export ratio for (i, j) pairs in
the treatment group. Further, let K(i, j) denote the set of countries with whom both i and j never form
an RTA, and define Ct(i, j) =
∑
c∈K(i,j)
(vacjt+vajct)+(vacit+vaict)
(xcjt+xjct)+(xcit+xict)
to be the value-added to export ratio for
trade between i and j with the control group. If t = 0 is the year of RTA adoption, then we compute Tt(i, j)
and Ct(i, j) for t = [−20, 20] for each pair and take an unweighted average of each series across all pairs.
17As discussed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the pair fixed effect accounts for endogenous adoption of
agreements based on time-invariant characteristics of the bilateral pair. In some specifications, we also add
a pair-specific linear trend (δyijt), which controls for endogenous adoption based on trending characteristics.
These controls also absorb pair-specific levels and trends in unmeasured trade costs.
11
have an RTA in force, the second distinguishes “shallow” from “deep” agreements, and the
third allows for phase-in effects.18 We estimate this equation using data at five-year intervals
from 1970 to 2009 (the 2005-2009 interval is four years).
Table 1 reports the estimation results. We find that adoption of trade agreements low-
ers value-added relative to gross exports among countries in those agreements. Using the
simple binary RTA indicator (RTAijt), the ratio falls by about 5% following adoption of
an agreement. In columns 3 and 4, we split out the effects of different agreements. While
signing a preferential agreement has no impact on the ratio of value-added to gross exports,
adoption of an FTA lowers the ratio of value-added to gross exports. Further, “deeper”
CUCMEU agreements are associated with larger declines than FTAs. Following adoption
of a CUCMEU, the ratio declines between 8-12%, whereas adoption of a FTA is associated
with a drop of 4-5%. The response of gross and value-added trade flows to RTA adoption
are reported in Panels B and C. Consistent with the changes in value-added to export ratios,
we find that gross exports rise more following the adoption of RTAs than do value-added
exports, with larger differences for “deep” agreements.
To quantify adjustment dynamics, we report the coefficients on RTA indicators for specific
periods post-RTA adoption in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1. Consistent with the dynamics in
Figure 5, the impact of RTA adoption appears to grow over time.19 Upon adoption of the
RTA, the ratio of value-added to gross exports falls by 3-5% and then continue to fall over
the duration of the agreement. The total effect levels off at around 9-11%. Value added and
gross exports follow similar adjustment dynamics, with value-added exports rising between
28-39% and gross exports rising between 37-50% in the long run.
18In terms of depth, we distinguish preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade agreements (FTA),
and customs unions, common markets, and economic unions (CUCMEU). To allow for phase-in effects, we
define a set of indicator variables: RTAijt(1) takes the value 1 in the RTA adoption year, RTAijt(2) equals
1 in the 5th year, RTAijt(3) equals 1 in the tenth year, and RTAijt(4) equals 1 one for years 15 onward.
19Adjustment dynamics may arise for several reasons. First, trade agreements are typically phased in, so
impact of the agreement may grows over time. Second, it may take time for trade flows to respond to those
changes. Third, countries with weaker agreements may adopt stronger agreements at a later date, so the
depth of liberalization evolves over time within pairs.
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2.3 Summing Up: Five Stylized Facts
To sum up, we have documented five stylized facts. The first is that the ratio of world
value-added to gross exports has fallen over time, by roughly ten percentage points and
mostly post-1990. The second is that the ratio of value-added to gross exports has fallen for
manufacturing, but actually risen outside of manufacturing. The third fact is that changes
have been heterogeneous across countries, with fast growing countries seeing larger declines
in the ratio of their value-added to gross exports. The fourth and fifth facts concern bilateral
changes: declines in value-added to export ratios have been larger for proximate partners
and country pairs that adopted regional trade agreements.
3 What Driving Forces Account for the Facts?
In this section, we ask: what driving forces account for the five stylized facts identified in
Section 2? Are they products of distinct driving forces, or do common driving forces account
for multiple facts simultaneously? These questions are difficult to answer with data alone.
Many features of the global economy have changed over time, and these changes are linked
together: any given candidate driving force (e.g., changes in productivity, endowments, trade
frictions, etc.) leads to changes in multiple aspects of the input-output system. Therefore,
we need a structural equilibrium framework to disentangle competing explanations for the
stylized facts.
We develop an Armington-style model with cross-sector and cross-country input-output
linkages suited to this task. The analysis then proceeds in two steps. First, we use the model
as a measurement device. While we are able to collect data on some driving forces (e.g.,
changes in factor inputs and productivity across countries), it is difficult to directly measure
others. Specifically, trade costs are difficult to measure in a comprehensive, consistent way
through time [Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)]. Changes in preferences and production
technologies needed to match final and input expenditure across sectors are also unobserved.
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Therefore, we combine the model and data to infer them.20
Second, we apply the model in a series of counterfactuals to assign responsibility to
particular driving forces for changes in value-added to gross exports in the data. To preview
the main result, we demonstrate that changes in trade frictions provide a unifying explanation
for all five stylized facts. Following up on this result, we use the model to study the role of
particular components of trade frictions in greater detail in Section 4.
3.1 Framework
This section lays out the core elements of the model. Details regarding the model and its
solution are collected in the Online Appendix.
3.1.1 Economic Environment
Each country combines domestic factors with purchased intermediate inputs to produce a
unique, Armington differentiated good in each sector. Denoting the quantity of the good
produced by country i in sector s as Qit(s), the production function takes the form:
Qit(s) =
[
λVi (s)
1−σVit(s)σ + (1− λVi (s))1−σXit(s)
]1/σ
, (5)
Vit(s) = Zit(s)Kit(s)
αLit(s)
1−α, (6)
Xit(s) =
[∑
s′
λXit (s
′, s)1−σXit(s′, s)σ
]1/σ
, (7)
Xit(s
′, s) =
[∑
j
Xjit(s
′, s)κ
]1/κ
, (8)
20Our approach to measuring trade frictions is closely related to “ratio-type estimation” in gravity models
[Head and Mayer (2014)]. Our approach to measuring changes in preferences and production technologies is
closely related to methods used to infer changes in product quality in the trade literature and wedges in the
business cycle accounting literature.
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where the λ’s denote CES share parameters.21 In words, gross output is produced by com-
bining real value added Vit(s) and a composite intermediate input Xit(s). Real value added
is a Cobb-Douglas composite of capital Kit(s) and labor Lit(s), combined with productivity
Zit(s). The composite input is formed by combining composite inputs purchased from dif-
ferent sectors, where Xit(s
′, s) is the quantity of a composite input from sector s′ purchased
by sector s in country i. Xit(s
′, s) is itself a composite of inputs sourced from different coun-
tries, where Xjit(s
′, s) is the quantity of inputs from country j embodied in Xit(s′, s). Gross
output is used as both a final and intermediate good. We assume that there are iceberg
frictions associated with purchasing inputs and final goods. These frictions apply to both
domestic and imported goods, and they differ by sectors (or sector-pairs) and end use. The
market clearing condition for gross output is:
Qit(s) =
∑
s′
∑
j
τXijt(s, s
′)Xijt(s, s′) +
∑
j
τFijt(s)Fijt(s), (9)
where the indexing on trade costs (the τ ’s) is the same as for goods flows.
A composite final good in each country is produced by aggregating final goods purchases:
Fit =
[∑
s
λFit(s)
1−ρFit(s)ρ
]1/ρ
with Fit(s) =
[∑
j
Fjit(s)
κ
]1/κ
, (10)
where Fit(s) is the quantity of a sector-level composite goods and Fjit(s) is the quantity of
final goods from sector s purchased by country i from country j.
This composite final good is used for both consumption (Cit) and investment (Iit), with
Fit = Cit + Iit. As is standard, investment determines the aggregate capital stock: Ki,t+1 =
Iit + (1 − δit)Kit, where Iit is real investment and δit is the depreciation rate. We assume
21We impose constant share parameters λVi (s) in Equation (5) because we do not have the gross output
price data necessary to infer changes in λVi (s). Because we omit CES weight parameters in Equation (8) and
(10), we attribute changes in cross-country sourcing (conditional on factory-gate prices) to changes in trade
frictions, as is standard in the literature [Head and Mayer (2014)]. Because we solve the model in changes,
time-invariant CES weights have no impact on the model equilibrium or interpretation. Time-varying CES
weights would be picked up in the trade frictions that we back out of the data.
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that each country is endowed with labor Lit, which is inelastically supplied to firms. The
market clearing conditions for capital and labor are: Kit =
∑
sKit(s) and Lit =
∑
s Lit(s).
To close the model, we assume that real investment is proportional to final expenditure,
as in Levchenko and Zhang (2016). That is, Iit = sitFit, where sit is an exogenous investment
share parameter.22 Together with the representative consumer’s budget constraint, this pins
down consumption. The budget constraint takes the form pFitFit =
∑
s[ritKit(s)+witLit(s)]+
Tit, where p
F
it is the price of the final composite, rit and wit are the prices of capital and
labor, and Tit is a nominal transfer received by agents in country i. We assume Tit (i.e., the
trade balance) is exogenous.
Following Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008), we solve for the model’s competitive equi-
librium in changes. In doing so, we take changes in trade balances, productivity, labor
endowments, and the investment share as given. We define the equilibrium and collect the
equilibrium conditions (in levels and changes) in the Online Appendix.
3.1.2 Quantification
To operationalize the model, we need to assign values to model parameters and collect data on
exogenous forcing variables. Further, we need to back changes in unknown parameters (e.g.,
trade frictions, preference/technology parameters) out of the data. We provide an overview
of the procedure here, with details in the Online Appendix. As a practical matter, we use a
two-sector version of the model and data to simplify the parametrization, computation, and
counterfactual analysis. The two sectors are manufacturing (m) and non-manufacturing (n)
sectors (s ∈ {m,n}).
Parameters and Exogenous Variables The parameter κ governs substitution across
countries in final and intermediate input purchases. We set κ = 0.75 – corresponding to
22We discuss this assumption further in the Online Appendix. We back changes in sit out of data and
include them among the exogenous forcing variables in the simulations.
16
an elasticity of substitution of 4 – to match standard estimates of the trade elasticity.23
The parameter ρ governs the cross-sector elasticity of substitution in final demand, while
σ governs substitution between real value added and inputs, as well as across inputs from
different sectors. We set σ = ρ = −1, corresponding to an elasticity of substitution equal
to 0.5. This means that manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors are complements in
final demand, and that value added and inputs, and inputs across sectors, are complements
on the production side. These assumptions are both supported by existing evidence.24
We also need values for the parameters {α, δit} and the exogenous forcing variables
{sˆit, Tˆit, Zˆit(s), Lˆit}. We set α = 0.3, and we set the remaining values based on our input-
output data and the Penn World Tables.
Trade Frictions and Expenditure Weights We introduce the following notation and
nomenclature to clarify what aspects of trade frictions and preference/technology parame-
ters we are able to back out of the data.25 First, we normalize international iceberg frictions
relative to domestic frictions: ωXjit(s
′, s) ≡ τXjit(s′, s)/τXiit(s′, s) and ωFjit(s) ≡ τFjit(s)/τFiit(s).
Henceforth, we refer to ωXjit(s
′, s) and ωFjit(s) as “trade frictions,” since they govern sub-
stitution across country sources. Given this normalization of the international frictions,
we define a second set of “expenditure weights” that combine CES weight parameters and
domestic frictions: ωXit (s
′, s) ≡ λXit (s′, s)(σ−1)/στXiit(s′, s), ωFit (s) ≡ λFit(s)(ρ−1)/ρτFiit(s). These
expenditure weights govern substitution across sectors in sourcing inputs and final goods.
To compute changes in trade frictions and expenditure weights, we need additional price
23This is the mean SITC 3-digit trade elasticity reported in Broda and Weinstein (2006). Note that we
implicitly restrict κ to be the same in both sectors. This is consistent with the fact that the mean Broda-
Weinstein elasticity estimates for non-manufacturing (SITC 1-4) and manufacturing (SITC 5-8) are both
close to 4.
24The low final expenditure elasticity is consistent with the fact that both the share of non-manufacturing
in final expenditure and the relative price of non-manufacturing output have been rising over time. This
observation motivates low elasticities in the structural change literature [Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Herren-
dorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2013)]. Low substitutability in production is consistent with recent estimates
by Atalay (2015) and Oberfield and Raval (2015).
25If domestic trade frictions are constant, then we could identify changes in the level of international trade
frictions and changes in the CES expenditure weights in preferences and technologies. We do not assume
that domestic frictions are constant, so we must redefine parameters here.
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data, not already included in our global input-output data. We need changes in the price
of real value added in each sector pˆVi (s), and changes in the price of final expenditure pˆ
F
i .
Drawing on national accounts sources, we set pˆVi (s) equal to changes in GDP deflators in
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and we set pˆFi equal to changes in the
ratio of nominal to real final expenditure.26 We use this price data, along with first order
conditions and price indexes from the model, to solve for changes in the trade frictions and
expenditure weights implied by changes in expenditure shares over time.
The estimates we recover via this procedure are sensible and consistent with related
work.27 Globally, iceberg trade frictions decline by 35% from 1970-2009. There is significant
dispersion in the magnitude of the declines across countries, and declines are strongly corre-
lated with changes in openness (as expected). Trade frictions decline both in manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors, though declines are somewhat larger for manufactures. As
we discuss further in Section 4.2, RTA adoption predicts declines in trade frictions at the
bilateral level. As for the expenditure weights, changes in final goods expenditure weights
are similar across manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, while input expenditure
weights have tended to pull input expenditure toward non-manufacturing.
3.2 Counterfactuals
We now conduct counterfactuals in the model to assess the role of trade frictions in ex-
plaining changes in value-added to export ratios. The first counterfactual holds both trade
frictions and expenditure weights constant at their 1970 levels. Following our notation above,
ωˆXit (s
′, s) = ωˆFit (s) = ωˆ
X
jit(s
′, s) = ωˆFjit(s) = 1, and the exogenous variables {sˆit, Tˆit, Zˆit(s), Lˆit}
evolve as in the data. We treat this simulation as the baseline against which we assess the
relative importance of trade versus expenditure weights.
26We take price changes and exchange rates (to convert GDP and final expenditure deflators to a common
currency) from the UN National Accounts Database, with one exception. For China, we take pˆVi (s) from
the World Development Indicators, since it is missing for many years in the UN Database.
27For example, our estimated changes in trade frictions are comparable to estimates by Jacks, Meissner
and Novy (2011). See the Online Appendix for detailed discussion.
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The second and third counterfactuals decompose the gap between this baseline and the
data into components due to trade frictions versus expenditure weights. The second coun-
terfactual holds expenditure weights constant at their 1970 levels (ωˆXit (s
′, s) = ωˆFit (s) = 1)
and allows trade frictions to evolve as implied by the data. The third counterfactual holds
trade frictions constant at their 1970 levels (ωˆXjit(s
′, s) = ωˆFjit(s) = 1) and allows expenditure
weights to evolve as implied by the data.
Figure 6 plots changes in value-added to export ratios for the world as a whole.28 In
the baseline simulation of the model, there is virtually no long run change in the ratio of
value-added to gross exports. This means that changes in country size and sectoral output
composition, driven by both productivity and factor endowments in the baseline simulation,
do not explain the decline in the ratio of value-added to gross exports. Interestingly, these
results obtain even though world trade does rise substantially in this counterfactual simu-
lation: the baseline model alone accounts for about 40% of the growth of trade since 1970.
The stability of the value-added to export ratio simply means that this gross trade growth
is matched by increases in value-added exports. Adding expenditure weights to the model
does little to change this result. In contrast, allowing trade frictions to change generates a
simulated series that captures the evolution of the ratio of value-added to gross exports well.
Figure 7 plots changes in value-added to export ratios at the sector level. Here again,
the baseline simulation performs poorly. It accounts for only a small part of the declining
value-added to export ratio in manufacturing, and the ratio in non-manufacturing moves
in the wrong direction entirely. Expenditure weights close the gap between simulation and
data, but their explanatory power is limited. Where they play a role is in explaining the
medium-term dynamics of the manufacturing VAX ratio, capturing the pre-1990 slowdown
and post-1990 acceleration in the rate of decline. Trade frictions are important in explaining
changes in the VAX ratio for both sectors. They explain changes in the non-manufacturing
sector almost completely, and explain more than half of the steady decline in manufacturing.
28To match the simulation, the ‘true’ value-added to export ratios in these figures are computed using a
thirty-seven country, two-sector aggregation of the data.
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Figure 8 plots changes in value-added to export ratios from 1975-2005 at the country
level. As in previous figures, both the baseline simulation and the simulation with changes
in expenditure weights struggle to match the data. The baseline simulation under-predicts
the magnitude of the declines, particularly for countries with large declines. Expenditure
weights generate additional dispersion, but do little to improve the overall fit. Again, changes
in trade frictions bring the simulated data in line with actual changes for most countries.
The visual impression conferred by the figures is confirmed by more systematic measures of
the goodness of fit. The correlations between simulations and data are 0.39 in panels (a)
and (b), and 0.69 in panel (c). Mean errors are 0.11, 0.08, and 0.03 for the three simulations
(in order).
Turning to bilateral flows, we estimate the same regressions used to describe the stylized
facts in Section 2 using simulated data. The left panel of Table 2 includes long difference
regressions that focus on the role distance, while the right panel examines the role of RTAs.
Consistent with the discussion above, the baseline simulation fails badly at explaining the
distance or RTA results. Input-output and final goods expenditure weights do a little better
for the distance effects. However, it looks initially like they help explain declines in the value-
added to export ratio surrounding RTAs. This apparent good performance is misleading.
Looking at Panels B and C, changes in input-output and final goods expenditure weights
lower the simulated bilateral VAX ratio because they lead bilateral value-added exports to
fall post-RTA adoption, while gross exports are unchanged – both these results are grossly
inconsistent with the data. Changes in trade frictions, instead, do well in matching both the
distance and RTA evidence. They predict both the decline in the VAX ratio and the rise in
value-added and gross exports post-RTA adoption.
To sum up, we set out to evaluate the role of trade frictions in explaining the data. The
counterfactuals point to changes in trade frictions as the most important force underlying all
five stylized facts. We therefore shift our attention to examining the role of trade frictions
in greater detail.
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4 Interpreting the Role of Trade Frictions
To interpret the role of trade frictions in explaining the five facts, we unpack the fric-
tions themselves. First, we distinguish trade frictions by sector (manufacturing vs. non-
manufacturing) and end use (final vs. intermediate goods). We simulate the model with
each set of frictions independently, and we use these simulations together with accounting
relationships to examine the mechanics underlying changes in multilateral value-added to
export ratios. Second, we hone in on bilateral frictions to examine the role of policy changes
– specifically, RTA adoption – in driving changes in value-added to export ratios.
4.1 Unpacking Trade Frictions
We run four new counterfactual simulations with changes in (1) final non-manufacturing
trade frictions, holding other trade frictions fixed (ωˆFjit(m) = ωˆ
X
jit(s
′, s) = 1), (2) input non-
manufacturing trade frictions (with ωˆFjit(s) = ωˆ
X
jit(m, s) = 1), (3) final manufacturing trade
frictions (with ωˆFjit(n) = ωˆ
X
jit(s
′, s) = 1), and (4) input manufacturing trade frictions (with
ωˆFjit(s) = ωˆ
X
jit(n, s) = 1). In all these simulations, expenditure weights are held constant
at 1970 levels (ωˆXit (s
′, s) = ωˆFit (s)). These four simulations decompose the Trade Frictions
simulation presented previously, so we compare them that simulation in the analysis below.
4.1.1 Results
Along all three dimensions of the multilateral data – for the world, countries, and sec-
tors – trade frictions for manufactures are more important than trade frictions for non-
manufacturing output. Further, among manufacturing trade frictions, frictions for inputs
are more important than frictions for final goods.
In Figure 9, we plot the four simulations for the world. As is evident, changes in trade
frictions for manufacturing goods used as inputs generate a large decline in the simulated
value-added to export ratio. While changes in the remaining frictions are less important,
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the ratio also declines due to changes in frictions for final manufacturing goods (particularly
post-1990).
Turning to sectors, we plot value-added to export ratios in the four simulations in Figure
10. Here again, manufacturing trade frictions do the bulk of the work. Frictions on manu-
factured inputs are most important in accounting for the decline in the manufacturing ratio,
though frictions on final manufactures matter as well. For the non-manufacturing sector,
final manufacturing frictions are most important, with input-manufacturing frictions also
playing a role in explaining the rising value-added to export ratio in this sector.
At the country level, all four simulations generate data that is positively correlated with
the composite Trade Frictions simulation, and roughly equally so (the correlations are all near
0.5). However, simulations with changes in non-manufacturing frictions alone underpredict
the size of the declines in value-added to export ratios: the mean error is 0.10 in simulation
(1) and 0.08 in simulation (2). In contrast, simulations with changes in manufacturing
frictions generate significant declines in value-added to export ratios, with a mean error of
0.04 in simulation (3) and -0.006 in simulation (4). From this, we conclude that frictions for
manufactured inputs are most important in explaining country-level ratios as well.
4.1.2 Interpretation
To interpret these results, we combine accounting results with the intuitive mechanics of
the model. We start by explaining the link between sector-level trends and the world-level
results, and then we discuss sector trends themselves in detail. We conclude with a brief
discussion of heterogeneity across countries.
Aggregating Sector Trends The world value-added to export ratio can be written as a
trade-weighted average of sector-level ratios: V AXt =
∑
s
(
Xt(s)
Xt
)
V AXit(s). This suggests
a simple Between-Within decomposition of changes in V AXt between year t and year t− 1
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into components due to changes in V AXt(s) versus sectoral trade shares:
∆V AXt =
∑
s
ω¯t(s)∆V AXt(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within
+
∑
s
V AX t(s)∆ωt(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between
, (11)
where ∆ denotes time differences, ω¯t(s) ≡ 12(ωt(s) +ωt−1(s)) with ωt(s) =
∑
i 6=j xijt(s)∑
i 6=j
∑
s xijt(s)
, and
V AX t(s) ≡ 12(V AXt(s) + V AXt−1(s)).
We report this decomposition in actual and simulated data in Table 3. In the data, both
the between and within terms are negative, and the within term is larger than the between
term. The within term is obviously driven by the decline in the manufacturing value-added to
export ratio, which dominates the rise in the non-manufacturing ratio because manufactures
account for 60-70% of world trade. The between term is negative because the share of
manufacturing rises over the period, and the level of the value-added to export ratio is lower
in manufacturing than non-manufacturing. The between term is modest in size because
changes in trade shares are small (a few percentage points).
Turning to simulation results, the Trade Frictions counterfactual generates negative
within and between effects, consistent with the data. Breaking the trade frictions apart,
only the simulation with declines in trade frictions for manufactures used as inputs matches
this pattern (and hence the data). All the other trade frictions simulations generate results
that point in the wrong direction for explaining the data, in one way or another.29 Falling
input frictions for manufacturing goods lower the value-added to export ratio in manufac-
turing (as in Figure 10), and this drives the within effect. They also increase the share of
manufactures in trade, which accounts for the negative between effect.
29Non-manufacturing trade costs generate negative within effects, but (counterfactual) positive between
effects. The between effects arise because declines in non-manufacturing trade frictions raise the share of non-
manufacturing in trade, and non-manufacturing has a higher value-added to export ratio than manufacturing.
Declining trade frictions for final manufactures generate strong negative between effects, but positive within
effects. The negative between effect here arises because declines in manufacturing frictions raise the share
of manufactures in trade. The positive within effect is a product of the strong rise in VAX ratios for
non-manufacturing in response to falling final manufacturing trade frictions.
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Sector Trends We now turn our attention to explaining the sector trends themselves.
To do this, it is helpful to appeal to the tight (empirical and conceptual) link between
value-added to export ratios and the domestic content of exports. Domestic content is
the value of exports less the import content of exports, and it measures the amount of
domestic value added needed to produce exports [Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001)]. As an
empirical matter, sector-level domestic content is approximately equal to sector-level value-
added exports [Johnson and Noguera (2012a)]. We therefore use domestic content as a
proxy for value-added exports in interpreting sector trends, because domestic content is a
mathematically simpler object to interpret.
Formally, domestic content can be written as DCit = Rit(I − ADit)−1Xit, where Rit
is a matrix with sector-level value-added to output ratios rit(s) along the diagonal, ADit
is the domestic input-output matrix, and Xit is the export vector of country i.
30 The
domestic content to gross export ratio at the sector level is then: DCit(s)/Xit(s) = wit(s, s)+
wit(s, s
′)(Xit(s′)/Xit(s)), where the weights wit(s, s′) are the elements of Rit(I−ADit)−1 and
indicate how much domestic content from sector s is needed to produce exports from sector
sector s′. These weights depend both on cross-sector input linkages – how much output
from sector s is used in producing exports in sector s′ (via (I −ADit)−1) and the imported-
input intensity of production in sector s (via Rit). Finally, note that this ratio depends
directly on export composition, because domestic content is both exported directly via a
sector’s own exports and indirectly via exports of other sectors. As indirect exports rise,
then DCit(s)/Xit(s) will rise.
Putting these observations to work, falling frictions on manufactured inputs increase
foreign sourcing in the manufacturing sector, and hence drive down DCit(m)/Xit(m) in
manufacturing. They also simultaneously drive up DCit(n)/Xit(n), because they raise the
share of manufactures in trade, which in turn raises the level of indirect exports by the
non-manufacturing sector. Falling frictions on final manufactures have similar composi-
30To interpret this, (I − ADit)−1Xit is the amount of domestic gross output needed to produce exports,
so multiplying by the value-added to output ratio yields a measure of domestic content in exports.
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tional effects, which explains why they too raise the value-added to export ratio in non-
manufacturing. These compositional effects also contribute to the decline in the value-added
to export ratio in manufacturing, since they lower indirect exports of manufacturing value
added, by reducing (Xit(n)/Xit(m)). Together these mechanisms explain the dominant role
of manufacturing trade frictions in explaining the trends in sector-level VAX ratios, depicted
in Figure 9.
Country-Level Changes Looking at cross-country changes in value-added to export ra-
tios, the same basic within and between forces come into play as in the aggregate. As at
the world level, the value-added to export ratio in manufacturing declines in virtually all
countries. The large majority of countries also see increases in value-added to export ratios
in non-manufacturing. Further, the level of the non-manufacturing ratio is higher than the
manufacturing VAX essentially everywhere.
The main difference is that between effects are more important in explaining country-
level changes than they are at the world level. The reason is that changes in trade shares
are substantially larger at the country-level than in the aggregate, so they play a larger role
in the between-within decomposition. Countries with the largest declines in value-added to
export ratios tend to have very large, negative between effects (i.e., tend to see large increases
in the share of manufacturing exports). Because declines in manufacturing trade frictions
increase manufacturing exports, they are important in explaining cross-country variation as
well.
4.2 The Role of Regional Trade Agreements
We now turn to assessing the role of regional trade agreements in our results. Our first
goal is to confirm that Fact 5 – that RTAs lower bilateral value-added to export ratios –
is explained entirely by changes in bilateral trade costs surrounding RTA adoption. Our
second goal is to quantify how much of the decline in the world value-added to export ratio
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is explained by the spread of RTAs over time.
The approach we take is to simulate a counterfactual world in which no new regional trade
agreements were adopted between 1970 and 2009, and then we compare this to data. To
do this, we need to construct counterfactual trade frictions that capture how trade frictions
would have evolved in the absence of post-1970 RTAs. We proceed in two steps (see the
Online Appendix for details). In the first step, we model trade frictions as a function of
RTAs and other unobserved time-varying importer, exporter, and pair-specific factors. We
then estimate the impact of RTA adoption by regressing changes in measured frictions (for
each input sector-pair or final goods sector separately) on fixed effects and trade agreement
indicators. In the second step, we use the estimated RTA coefficients to adjust the measured
trade frictions, removing changes in trade frictions due to RTA adoption.31
As expected, our estimates indicate that RTA adoption lowers bilateral trade frictions
among adopting countries.32 To summarize the magnitudes, trade frictions fall by roughly
7-8% after RTA adoption when we measure RTA adoption using a simple binary indicator.
When we allow for dynamic phase-in effects, RTAs lower trade frictions by 16-20% in the
long run. We view these estimates as lower and upper bounds on plausible RTA-impacts.
When we separate agreements, we find an ordering of changes in trade frictions consistent
with our previous gravity results: deep trade agreements are associated with larger declines
in trade frictions than shallower agreements.
Using these results, we simulate the model with counterfactual trade frictions, removing
post-1970 RTAs and allowing all other driving forces (including changes in expenditure
weights) to evolve as implied by data. This means that deviations between simulated and
true data in this set of results reflect only the removal of RTAs. To frame the analysis,
recall that we showed (in Table 2) that changes in trade frictions can account for declines in
value-added relative to gross exports following adoption of regional trade agreements (Fact
31For pairs that form a new RTA after 1970, trade frictions equal measured values prior to RTA adoption
and then are adjusted upward post-RTA as if the RTA were never signed. For all pairs that either never
form an RTA or already had an RTA in force in 1970, trade frictions evolve as in the data.
32See Table C3 of the Online Appendix for the full set of estimates.
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5). We now demonstrate that changes in bilateral frictions attributable to RTA adoption
drive this result.
Using the simulated data, we re-estimate the baseline regressions specifications used
previously to document RTA effects. Because we have removed changes in trade frictions
attributable to RTAs, we expect RTAs to have no effect on bilateral value-added to export
ratios in these regressions. In fact, that is exactly what we find. In Panel A of Table 4, the
RTA-coefficient is numerically close to, and statistically indistinguishable from, zero. This
holds regardless of the technique we use to remove RTAs. Further, this result reflects zero
impact of regional agreements on both value-added exports (Panel B) and gross exports
(Panel C) when RTAs are removed. These results imply that RTA-induced changes in
bilateral trade frictions alone drive the differential response of bilateral value-added versus
gross trade that we observe in the data post-RTA adoption.
An important remaining question is: does the spread of RTAs also help explain the global
decline in the ratio of value-added to gross exports? The answer is that post-1970 RTAs can
explain roughly 6-15% of the overall decline. With RTA effects estimated using a binary
RTA indicator, the ratio of value-added to gross exports for the world as a whole falls by
about 6% less in the counterfactual than in the data. When we split agreements by type,
the ratio of value-added to gross exports falls by about 13% less in the counterfactual than
in the data. Allowing for phase-in effects, the ratio falls by about 15% less than in the data.
These magnitudes are sizable given that only about a third of all country pairs adopt RTAs
during the sample period, and many of these post-1990 agreements have yet to reach their
peak impact. We conclude that the spread of RTAs has played a significant quantitative role
in driving the global decline in value-added relative to gross exports.
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5 Conclusion
With the rise of cross-border supply chains, conventional (gross) trade data is an increasingly
misleading guide to how value added is traded in the global economy. In this paper, we
characterized changes in gross versus value-added trade over four decades. Value-added
exports are falling relative to gross exports, implying double counting in gross trade data is
more pervasive today than in the past. Importantly, gaps between gross and value-added
exports are unevenly distributed across time, sectors, countries, and bilateral partners. These
differences imply that shifting from a gross to value-added view of trade changes the relative
openness of sectors or countries, and the relative importance of bilateral trade partners for
a given country.
Using a structural gravity model, we found that changes in trade frictions play a first-
order role in explaining not only global trends, but also differences across countries, sectors,
and bilateral partners. We emphasize in particular that regional trade agreements have led to
declines in value-added relative to gross trade among adopting partners, such that the spread
of RTAs over time can account for 15% of the decline in the world value-added to export
ratio over time. In contrast, other major structural changes in the global economy (e.g.,
the increasing weight of emerging markets in global GDP) play a minimal role. Changes in
sector-level patterns of input use and demand are also relatively unimportant, as compared
to the role of trade frictions.
Our results have a number of implications for future research. First, the value-added
data we provide are immediately useful for parameterizing quantitative models. Because
the value-added content is falling over time, shifting from gross to value-added export data
in empirical applications is more important now than ever. Second, the large role of trade
frictions in explaining changes in gross versus value-added trade calls for re-visiting classic
questions about the burden of trade frictions. For example, how do gross trade frictions map
into reduced form frictions for trading value added, or how do RTAs induce trade creation
vs. diversion in value-added exports? Third, if one knows the factor/task contents employed
28
in producing value added, one can immediately convert value-added exports into bilateral
measures of factor/task trade. Therefore, the type of value-added data we provide should
be useful in analyzing models of factor/task trade, including the role of factor/task trade in
explaining changes in the distribution of income.
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Table 1: Panel Regressions with Regional Trade Agreements
Panel A: Log VAX Ratio
By Agreement Type With Phase-in Effects
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
RTA -0.046*** -0.054*** RTA(1) -0.030* -0.046**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
PTA -0.004 -0.002 RTA(2) -0.051*** -0.074***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
FTA -0.035** -0.052*** RTA(3) -0.090*** -0.079***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029)
CUCMEU -0.115*** -0.082*** RTA(4) -0.113*** -0.088**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.036)
R2 0.74 0.85 0.74 0.85 0.74 0.85
Panel B: Log Value Added Exports
By Agreement Type With Phase-in Effects
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
RTA 0.256*** 0.222*** RTA(1) 0.176*** 0.193***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032)
PTA 0.081** -0.007 RTA(2) 0.292*** 0.305***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.047)
FTA 0.253*** 0.210*** RTA(3) 0.416*** 0.323***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.057)
CUCMEU 0.447*** 0.351*** RTA(4) 0.385*** 0.284***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.071)
R2 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99
Panel C: Log Gross Exports
By Agreement Type With Phase-in Effects
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6)
RTA 0.303*** 0.276*** RTA(1) 0.206*** 0.239***
(0.042) (0.046) (0.039) (0.046)
PTA 0.085* -0.005 RTA(2) 0.344*** 0.379***
(0.045) (0.052) (0.049) (0.064)
FTA 0.288*** 0.262*** RTA(3) 0.506*** 0.402***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.060) (0.077)
CUCMEU 0.561*** 0.434*** RTA(4) 0.498*** 0.373***
(0.057) (0.064) (0.061) (0.097)
R2 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98
Pair Trend X X X
Obs. 11158 11158 11158 11158 11158 11158
Note: All regressions include exporter-year, importer-year, and pair fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include
linear pair-specific trends. Standard errors, clustered by country pair, are in parentheses. Significance levels:
* p < .1 , ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Sample excludes pair-year observations with bilateral exports smaller
than $1 million or VAX ratios larger than ten.
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Table 3: Between-Within Decomposition of Changes in World Value-Added to Export Ratios
Between-Within Decomposition
V AX2009 − V AX1970 Between Term Within Term
Data -0.10 -0.03 -0.07
Trade Frictions -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
Final Non-Manufacturing 0.00 0.11 -0.11
Input Non-Manufacturing -0.02 0.10 -0.12
Final Manufacturing -0.05 -0.08 0.03
Input Manufacturing -0.10 -0.05 -0.06
Note: V AX2009 − V AX1970 is the change in the world value-added to export ratio from 1970 to 2009 for
the 37 countries in the simulation sample. The columns labeled Between and Within contain the cumulated
year-on-year values for the decomposition reported in Equation (11). The Trade Frictions row reports results
for simulated data with changes in all trade frictions (holding final and input expenditure weights constant).
Other rows include decompositions in simulated data for changes in the individual trade frictions indicated.
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Table 4: Panel Regressions in Simulated Data with Regional Trade Agreements Removed
Panel A: Log VAX Ratio
Approach to Removing RTAs
Data Binary RTA Split Agreement Types with Phase-in
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
RTA -0.045*** -0.005 -0.005 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71
Panel B: Log Value-Added Exports
Approach to Removing RTAs
Data Binary RTA Split Agreement Types with Phase-in
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
RTA 0.241*** 0.064* 0.034 0.005
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Panel C: Log Gross Exports
Approach to Removing RTAs
Data Binary RTA Split Agreement Types with Phase-in
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
RTA 0.286*** 0.068 0.039 -0.000
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Obs. 11291 11291 11291 11291
Note: Colums 2-4 report regression results for counterfactual simulated data in which the estimated impact of
RTAs has been removed from measured trade frictions, as described in the Online Appendix. All regressions
include exporter-year, importer-year, and pair fixed effects. The sample matches that used in Table 1.
Standard errors, clustered by country pair, are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1 , ** p < .05, ***
p < .01.
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Figure 1: Ratio of Value-Added to Gross Exports for the World
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Note: The world value-added to export ratio is V AXt ≡ (
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∑
s vaijt(s))/(
∑
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∑
s xijt(s)). The solid
line includes shipments to/from the rest of the world, and the dashed line excludes them.
Figure 2: Ratio of Value-Added to Gross Exports for the World, by Sector
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Note: The sector-level value-added to export ratio is V AXt(s) ≡ (
∑
i 6=j vaijt(s))/(
∑
i 6=j xijt(s)).
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Figure 3: Changes in Ratio of Value-Added to Gross Exports, by Country
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Note: Real GDP data is from the UN National Accounts Database. Panel (a) includes 37 countries for which
we have data back to 1970. All countries are included in Panel (b), and vertical labels denote countries with
less than 40 years of data. Red line denotes least squares regression line.
Figure 4: The Elasticity of Value-Added and Gross Exports to Distance
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Note: See Equation (3) for regression specification. Regressions include time-varying source and destination
fixed effects. Distance is the simple distance between the most populated cities in the two countries, from
the CEPII Gravity Dataset. The middle solid line indicates the point estimate, and upper/lower dashed
lines denote 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by country pair.
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Figure 5: Bilateral Value-Added to Export Ratios around Adoption of Regional Trade Agree-
ments
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Note: In each set of lines, the middle line indicates the group mean, and upper/lower dashed lines denote
90% confidence intervals for group means.
Figure 6: Actual and Simulated World Value-Added to Gross Export Ratios
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Figure 7: Actual and Simulated World Value-Added to Gross Export Ratios, by Sector
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Figure 8: Actual and Simulated World Value-Added to Gross Export Ratios by Country
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Figure 9: Simulated World Value-Added to Gross Export Ratios with Changes in Trade
Frictions
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Figure 10: Simulated World Value-Added to Gross Export Ratios with Changes in Trade
Frictions, by Sector
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Online Appendix for “A Portrait of Trade
in Value Added over Four Decades”
Robert C. Johnson Guillermo Noguera
October 2016
A Data Appendix
This appendix describes the data sources and procedures that we use to construct the input-
output framework. Further details are available from the authors on request.
A.1 National Accounts Data
To measure macroeconomic aggregates and sector-level production over time, we primarily
rely on the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database [http://unstats.
un.org/unsd/snaama]. For all countries other than China, we take aggregate GDP and the
expenditure side breakdown of GDP (consumption, investment, government spending, ex-
ports, and imports) from the UN data. We use data from the World Development Indicators
[http://databank.worldbank.org] for China.1 We also take sector-level GDP data from
these sources for the four composite sectors, and include the sector definitions in Table A2.
Finally, we extract goods and services trade shares in total exports and total imports from
the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BPM5) [http://elibrary-data.imf.org/], and
we use these shares to split exports and imports from the expenditure-side GDP data into
goods and services.
A.2 Trade Data
We combine bilateral commodity trade statistics with multilateral totals from the national
accounts to generate a bilateral trade database that is consistent in level terms with the
national accounts. First, we discuss bilateral commodity trade data sources, classification of
trade according to final and intermediate use, and correspondences to industry data. Second,
we discuss how we harmonize the commodity trade data with national accounts data. Third,
we discuss how we deal with missing bilateral services trade data.
For bilateral goods trade, we draw on the NBER-UN Database [http://cid.econ.
ucdavis.edu] for 1970-2000 and the CEPII BACI Database [http://www.cepii.fr] for
1995-2009. This data is reported on a commodity-basis. We assign commodities to end
uses and industries using existing correspondences from the World Bank [http://wits.
worldbank.org]. To assign commodities to end uses, we use correspondences between SITC
(Revision 2) 4-digit or HS (1996 Revision) 6-digit commodities and the BEC end use clas-
sifications. To assign commodities to industries, we use correspondences between SITC and
HS categories and ISIC (Revision 2) industries.2 We then map ISIC sectors into our four
composite sectors.
In general, these correspondences provide a clean mapping from the trade to end use
or industry classifications. We are able to match upwards of 95% of trade to industries in
most country years, and the match quality for the post-1995 BACI data is nearly perfect.
However, there are a few complications that we note here.
1Comparing the WDI to the UN data, values for most countries are nearly identical. China is an exception.
Upon examination of other sources (e.g., Chinese national accounts), the WDI data appears more accurate.
2For a few unassigned commodities, we use a supplemental correspondence between SITC and ISIC
classifications developed by Marc Muendler [http://econ.ucsd.edu/muendler/html/resource.html].
1
First, though most commodities map into unique end use classifications, some do not
(e.g., “motor spirits” in the BEC classification is a mixed use commodity). For these mixed
use commodities, we assign half the value to final use and half to intermediate use.
Second, some trade cannot be assigned using the correspondences. This problem occurs
primarily in the NBER-UN data, where there are aggregate categories ending in ’X’ (e.g.,
04XX) for some countries and years that include trade that could not be disaggregated.
Where possible, we map directly from higher levels of aggregation (e.g., SITC 2 digit codes)
to sectors/uses. Where necessary, we split unallocated SITC 1-digit residual trade across
sectors/uses using the world-level allocation shares for these categories.
Having formed a complete bilateral goods trade dataset, we need to harmonize the levels
of bilateral trade with aggregate exports and imports in the national accounts. The procedure
we use is as follows. First, we harmonize levels for aggregate bilateral goods trade with
national accounts totals.3 Second, we use the share of each sector and end use in bilateral
trade from the commodity trade data to allocate the harmonized bilateral goods trade to
sectors and end uses. This yields a sector-level bilateral final and intermediate goods trade
dataset that aggregates to match the national accounts.
Next, we turn to bilateral services trade. Unfortunately, bilateral services trade data has
not been collected with the same scope and rigor as goods trade data; Data on bilateral
services trade is incomplete today, and virtually nonexistent going back in time. Therefore
we impute these flows using multilateral data on services trade along with bilateral trade
shares for goods. This procedure is sensible, given the strong correlation between goods
and services trade shares in modern data. We run a constrained least squares program that
finds the bilateral services flows that minimize deviations between imputed services trade
shares and target shares (based on goods trade), subject to the constraint that the sum of
the bilateral flows be equal to multilateral exports and imports for each country.4
A.3 Input-Output Tables
We obtain input-output tables from the OECD Input-Output Database (1995 and 2011
editions) [http://www.oecd.org/sti/inputoutput/] and the IDE-JETRO Asian Input-
Output Tables [http://www.ide.go.jp/]. Benchmark tables are available for countries and
years listed in Table A1. The mapping between sectors in the input-output data and our
3In this step, we take bilateral trade shares from the commodity trade data and multiply them with the
level of goods exports and imports reported in the national accounts. This procedure yields two conflicting
estimates for each bilateral trade flow, one ‘exporter report’ from multiplying the trade share times reported
multilateral exports in a given source country and a corresponding ‘importer report’ from multiplying the
trade share times reported multilateral imports in a given destination. To reconcile the flows, we average the
flows to form a single bilateral flow and then add or subtract the residual (e.g., the exporter report minus
the reconciled trade flow) from trade flows with the rest of the world. This procedure occasionally results
in negative values for trade with the rest of the world, concentrated in particular countries and years where
either trade or national accounts data are suspect (e.g., for Argentina in the early 1970’s). We adjust the
data to eliminate these zeros using a constrained least squares procedure that penalizes changes in trade
shares among the 42 countries in our sample. The necessarily adjustments are trivially small.
4The target shares are constructed by multiplying goods trade shares with multilateral services trade
from the national accounts. As in the goods data, this yields conflicting exporter and importer reports, and
we set the reconciled flow equal to the average report, as in the previous footnote.
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four composite sectors are included in Table A2.5
In the input-output tables, there are accounting variables that we did not explicitly
define in our framework, such as statistical discrepancies, other adjustments, non-comparable
imports, and net taxes.6 In general, these tend to be small or exactly zero (due to how
data is reported from national authorities to the OECD). We drop net taxes, and therefore
define value added as output (the row sum of the tables) less inputs used (the column
sum of the domestic and import input-output tables).7 We allocate other adjustments and
non-comparable exports and imports to the services sector, based on the fact that non-
comparable imports in the U.S. input-output accounts are entirely services. Finally, values
in the input-output tables are reported in national currency in the OECD input-output
tables. We convert these to U.S. dollars using end-of-year exchange rates from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (AE series) and OECDStat. Values in the IDE-JETRO
tables are reported in U.S. dollars.
Because the input-output and national accounts data are taken from separate sources,
they are not identical. On top of this, input-output tables are available only for selected
benchmark years, which differ across countries. To reconcile data sources and extrapolate
from benchmark to non-benchmark years, we adjust the benchmark input-output data to
match the time-varying national accounts and trade data using a constrained least squares
procedure. In doing so, we give priority to matching the national accounts and trade data,
both because they are available in all years and measured consistently through time (likely
with less error). The objective is to minimize the weighted squared distance between the
adjusted data and input-output data for benchmark years (or interpolations thereof), subject
to a set of accounting identities. We pause here to spell out this procedure.
To define notation, let IDi and IIi be 4×4 matrices of domestic and imported inputs, with
elements IDi(s, s
′) and IIi(s, s′), let fDi and fIi be 4 × 1 vectors of domestic and imported
final demand, and let yi be a 4 × 1 vector of sector-level output. Further, the 4 × 1 vector
of exports is xi. Note we suppress year notation here for convenience.
In the national accounts and trade data, we observe the following objects, denoted with
bars to indicate data. We observe sector-level value added in a 1× 4 vector v¯ai and (scaler)
aggregate final demand f¯i. We also observe sector-level exports x¯i. On the import side, we
observe imports by sector and end use for goods – f¯Ii(s) and I¯Ii(s) for s = 1, 2, 3 – and
services imports m¯it(4).
Sector-level input use for domestic and imported intermediates (IDi, IIi), sector-level
domestic and imported final goods absorption (fDi, fIi(4)), and sector-level gross output
(yi(s)) are treated as unknowns. We observe ‘target’ values for each of these unknowns, based
on the value of these variables in the input-output tables for benchmark years, and linear
5The original OECD data covers 35 sectors for years before 1990 and 48 sectors for years after 1995,
though not all countries report data at this level of disaggregation. The IDE-JETRO tables contain 24
sectors. Aggregation enables us to link these tables.
6Further, in the pre-1995 data, a few countries have negative entries in their import tables, due to
treatment of transport margins, recycled products, and measurement error. We eliminate these using a
procedure similar to that which we use to merge the IO tables with the production and trade data below,
so omit details here for brevity.
7Recall that we adjust this data to match national accounts value added by sector. The only way value
added from the input-output tables is used is to create value-added to output ratios, which are the basis for
generating target values for gross output in the harmonization procedure described below.
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interpolations between benchmark years.8 We construct target sector output by dividing
value added from the national accounts by the value added to output ratio in the input-
output tables. We also construct target sector final expenditure by multiplying final demand
in the national accounts by sector shares from input-output tables.
In each year, we solve for values for these ‘unknown’ variables that: (a) minimize differ-
ences between the adjusted data and raw data observed in benchmark years (or interpolations
thereof between benchmark years); and (b) satisfy adding up constraints. We constrain the
solution to match sector-level GDP, exports and imports of final and intermediate goods for
each of the three goods sectors, exports and imports of services, and aggregate final expen-
diture. These constraints provide a lot of discipline in extrapolating the benchmark data.
For example, we exactly match the time series for sector-level intermediate goods imports
in all countries, which is the key determinant of vertical specialization.
With target values denoted by stars, then we solve:
min
∑
i
∑
s
∑
s′
[(
IDi(s, s
′)− I∗Di(s, s′)
I∗Di(s, s′)
)2
+
(
IIi(s, s
′)− I∗Ii(s, s′)
I∗Ii(s, s′)
)2]
+
∑
i
∑
s
[(
fDi(s)− f ∗Di(s)
f ∗Di(s)
)2
+
(
yi(s)− y∗i (s)
y∗i (s)
)2]
+
∑
i
(
fIi(4)− f ∗Ii(4)
f ∗Ii(4)
)2
subject to the following constraints:
yit(s) = v¯ait(s) +
∑
s′
[IIit(s
′, s) + IDit(s′, s)] ,
yit(s) = fDit(s) +
∑
s′
IDit(s, s
′) + x¯it(s),
m¯it(4) = fIit(4) +
∑
s′
IIit(4, s
′),
I¯Iit(s) =
∑
s′
IIit(s, s
′) for s = 1, 2, 3.
Note that in our data, m¯it(s) = f¯Iit(s) +
∑
s′ IIit(s, s
′) for s = 1, 2, 3 holds by construction.
Further, the constraints imposed above imply that final expenditure adds up by construction:
f¯i =
∑3
s=1 f¯Ii(s) + fIi(4) +
∑4
s=1 fDi(s). Therefore, we do not explicitly write these as
constraints in the program above, though these adding up conditions are also satisfied.
The solution to this program provides annual domestic and imported intermediate input
use and final demand values for the 42 countries between 1970 and 2009. Upon inspection,
input-output data adjustments are generally small and plausible.
8For years outside the range of years bracketed by benchmarks, we set the initial values equal to the
closest benchmark year. This is likely a conservative assumption, as it minimizes changes in input-output
tables over time.
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Table A1: Input-Output Data Coverage
Country Code early 70s mid 70s early 80s mid 80s early 90s mid 90s early 00s mid 00s
Argentina ARG . . . . . 1997 . .
Australia AUS 1968 1974 . 1986 1989 1994/95 2001/02 2004/05
Austria AUT . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Belgium BEL . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Brazil BRA . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Canada CAN 1971 1976 1981 1986 1990 1995 2000 2005
Chile CHL . . . . . 1996 . 2003
China CHN . . . 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Czech Republic CZE . . . . . . 2000 2005
Denmark DNK 1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Estonia EST . . . . . 1997 2000 2005
Finland FIN . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
France FRA 1972 1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Germany DEU . . 1978 1986 1988, 1990 1995 2000 2005
Greece GRC . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Hungary HUN . . . . . 1998 2000 2005
India IND . . . . . 1993/94 1998/99 2003/04
Indonesia IDN . . . 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Ireland IRL . . . . . 1998 2000 2005
Israel ISR . . . . . 1995 . 2004
Italy ITA . . . 1985 . 1995 2000 2005
Japan JPN 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Korea KOR . . . 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Mexico MEX . . . . . . . 2003
Netherlands NLD 1972 1977 1981 1986 . 1995 2000 2005
New Zealand NZL . . . . . 1995/96 2002/03 .
Norway NOR . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Poland POL . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Portugal PRT . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Romania ROU . . . . . . 2000 2005
Russia RUS . . . . . 1995 2000 .
Slovak Republic SVK . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Slovenia SVN . . . . . 1996 2000 2005
South Africa ZAF . . . . . 1993 2000 2005
Spain ESP . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Sweden SWE . . . . . 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland CHE . . . . . . 2001 .
Thailand THA . . . 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Turkey TUR . . . . . 1996 1998 2002
United Kingdom GBR 1968 . 1979 1984 1990 1995 2000 2005
United States USA 1972 1977 1982 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Vietnam VNM . . . . . . 2000 .
Note: Regular font indicates table is from the OECD Input-Output Database. Italics indicate table is from
the IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Tables.
Table A2: Sector Aggregation and Definitions
Sector Name ISIC Rev. 2 ISIC Rev. 3.1 1995 OECD codes 2011 OECD codes Asian IO codes
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1 A,B 1 1 1 to 5
2 Non-manufacturing industrial production 2,4,5 C,E,F 2,25,26 2, 3, 26 to 30 6,7,20,21
3 Manufactures 3 D 3 to 24, 35 4 to 25 8 to 19
4 Services 6 to 9 G to Q 27 to 34 31 to 48 23, 24
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B Model Appendix
This appendix describes the equilibrium of the model presented in Section 3.1. We also
discuss how we take the model to data, including how we use the model to recover trade fric-
tions and expenditure weights from data, how we compute productivity and the investment
share shock, and other technical details.
B.1 Equilibrium in Levels
Using the notation defined in Section 3.1.2, the we characterize the equilibrium as follows.
Representative producers in each sector choose {Lit(s), Kit(s), Xjit(s′, s)} to maximize
profits, given by pit(s)Qit(s)− witLit(s)− ritKit(s)−
∑
j
∑
s′(1 + τ
X
jit(s
′, s))pjt(s′)Xjit(s′, s),
taking prices {pit(s), wit, rit} as given and subject to the production function defined in
Equations (5)-(8). The first order conditions for production can be written as:
piVit (s) = λ
V
i (s)
(
pVit (s)
pit(s)
)σ/(σ−1)
(B1)
piXit (s
′, s) = (1− λVi (s))
(
ωXit (s
′, s)pXit (s
′, s)
pit(s)
)σ/(σ−1)
(B2)
piXjit(s
′, s) =
(
ωXjit(s
′, s)pjt(s′)
pXit (s
′, s)
)κ/(κ−1)
(B3)
ritKit(s) = αp
V
it (s)Vit(s) (B4)
witLit(s) = (1− α)pVit (s)Vit(s), (B5)
where piVit (s) ≡ pVit (s)Vit(s)/pit(s)Qit(s), piXit (s′, s) ≡ pXit (s′, s)Xit(s′, s)/pit(s)Qit(s), piXjit(s′, s) ≡
τXjit(s
′, s)pjt(s′)Xjit(s′, s)/pXit (s
′, s)Xit(s′, s), and the composite prices {pXit (s′, s), pVit (s)} are
given by:
pXit (s
′, s) =
[∑
j
(
ωXjit(s
′, s)pjt(s′)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
(B6)
pVit (s) =
(rit/α)
α(wit/(1− α))1−α
Zit(s)
. (B7)
Further, the price of gross output can be written as:
pit(s) =
[
λVit (s)p
V
it (s)
σ/(σ−1) + (1− λVi (s))
∑
s′
(
ωXit (s
′, s)pXit (s
′, s)
)σ/(σ−1)](σ−1)/σ
(B8)
Representative final goods producers maximize pFitFit −
∑
j
∑
s(1 + τ
F
jit(s))pjt(s)Fji(s),
taking prices {pFit , pjt(s)} as given and subject to the final goods production function in
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Equation (10). The first order conditions are:
piFit (s) =
(
ωFit (s)p
F
it(s)
pFit
)ρ/(ρ−1)
(B9)
piFjit(s) =
(
ωFjit(s)pjt(s)
pFit(s)
)κ/(κ−1)
, (B10)
where piFit (s) ≡ pFit(s)Fit(s)/pFitFit, piFjit(s) ≡ τFjit(s)pjt(s)Fjit(s)/pFit(s)Fit(s), and the compos-
ite prices {pFit(s)} are given by:
pFit(s) =
[∑
j
(
ωFjit(s)pjt(s)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
. (B11)
Further, the price of the composite final goods can be written as:
pFit =
[∑
s
(
ωFit (s)p
F
it(s)
)ρ/(ρ−1)](ρ−1)/ρ
. (B12)
The remaining market clearing and equilibrium conditions are:
pit(s)Qit(s) =
∑
s′
∑
j
piXijt(s, s
′)piXjt (s, s
′)pjt(s)Qjt(s) +
∑
j
piFijt(s)pi
F
jt(s)p
F
jtFjt (B13)
Kit =
∑
s
Kit(s) (B14)
Lit =
∑
s
Lit(s) (B15)
pFitFit =
∑
s
[ritKit(s) + witLit(s)] + Tit (B16)
Fit = Cit + Iit (B17)
Ki,t+1 = Iit + (1− δit)Kit (B18)
Iit = sitFit. (B19)
B.2 Equilibrium in Changes
Following Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008), we define and solve the model equilibrium in
changes. By way of notation, let xˆt ≡ xt+1xt . Then we can re-write the first-order conditions
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for production and demand as:
pˆiVit (s) =
(
pˆVit (s)
pˆit(s)
)σ/(σ−1)
(B20)
pˆiXit (s
′, s) =
(
ωˆXit (s
′, s)pˆXit (s
′, s)
pˆit(s)
)σ/(σ−1)
(B21)
pˆiXjit(s
′, s) =
(
ωˆXjit(s
′, s)pˆjt(s′)
pˆXit (s
′, s)
)κ/(κ−1)
(B22)
rˆitKˆit(s) = pˆ
V
it (s)Vˆit(s) (B23)
wˆitLˆit(s) = pˆ
V
it (s)Vˆit(s) (B24)
pˆiFit (s) =
(
ωˆFit (s)pˆ
F
it(s)
pˆFit
)ρ/(ρ−1)
(B25)
pˆiFjit(s) =
(
ωˆFjit(s)pˆjt(s)
pˆFti(s)
)κ/(κ−1)
. (B26)
Changes in price indexes take the form:
pˆit(s) =
[
piVit (s)pˆ
V
it (s)
σ/(σ−1) +
∑
s′
piXit (s
′, s)
(
ωˆXit (s
′, s)pˆXit (s
′, s)
)σ/(σ−1)](σ−1)/σ
(B27)
pˆXit (s
′, s) =
[∑
j
piXjit(s
′, s)
(
ωˆXjit(s
′, s)pˆjt(s′)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
(B28)
pˆVit (s) =
(rˆit)
α(wˆit)
1−α
Zˆit(s)
(B29)
pˆFit =
[∑
s
piFit (s)
(
ωˆFit (s)pˆ
F
it(s)
)ρ/(ρ−1)](ρ−1)/ρ
(B30)
pˆFit(s) =
[∑
j
piFjit(s)
(
ωˆFjit(s)pˆjt(s)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
(B31)
Other market clearing and equilibrium conditions are re-written as:
pit(s)Qit(s)pˆi(s)Qˆi(s) =
∑
j
piFijt(s)pi
F
jt(s)p
F
jtFjtpˆi
F
ij(s)pˆi
F
j (s)pˆ
F
j Fˆj
+
∑
s′
∑
j
piXijt(s, s
′)piXjt (s, s
′)pjt(s′)Qjt(s′)pˆiXij (s, s
′)pˆiXj (s, s
′)pˆj(s′)Qˆj(s′). (B32)
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KitKˆit =
∑
s
Kit(s)Kˆit(s) (B33)
LitLˆit =
∑
s
Lit(s)Lˆit(s) (B34)
pFitFitpˆ
F
i Fˆi =
∑
s
pVitVit(s)pˆ
V
it Vˆit(s) + TitTˆi (B35)
Fˆit = pi
C
it Cˆit + pi
I
itIˆit (B36)
Kˆi,t+1 =
Iˆit
Kˆit
[
Kˆit − (1− δit)
]
+ (1− δi,t+1) (B37)
Iˆit = sˆitFˆit, (B38)
where piCit =
pFitCit
pFitFit
and piIit =
pFitIit
pFitFit
are the value shares of consumption (private + government)
and investment in final expenditure. In the capital accumulation equation, note that Kˆit is
predetermined at date t (i.e., not a function of Iˆit), and so can be treated as given when
solving for equilibrium changes between dates t and t+ 1.
To parameterize the model, we need values for expenditure shares
{piVit (s), piXit (s′, s), piXjit(s′, s), piFit (s), piFjit(s), piCit , piIit} and expenditure levels
{pit(s)Qit(s), pVit (s)Vit(s), pFitFit, Tit}. We take these from data when we compute trade
frictions and expenditure weights. In counterfactual simulations, these are set to the initial
period (1970) value to compute changes between 1970-1971 and then set to counterfactual
values thereafter. In addition to the elasticities (discussed in the main text), we also need
depreciation rates {δit}. We also take these from data, as discussed below.
Equilibrium Definition Given an initial condition {Kˆi1}, changes in expenditure
weights Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆXjit(s′, s), ωˆXit (s′, s), ωˆFjit(s), ωˆFit (s)}, and changes in trade balances, produc-
tivity, labor endowments, and the investment share {Tˆit, Zˆit(s), Lˆit, sˆit}, an equilibrium
is a set of changes in quantities {Qˆit(s), Fˆit(s), Fˆit, Vˆit(s), Kˆit(s), Lˆit(s), Cˆit, Iˆit, Kˆi,t+1},
shares {pˆiVit (s), pˆiXit (s′, s), pˆiXjit(s′, s), pˆiFit (s), pˆiFjit(s)}, and prices
{pˆVit (s), pˆit(s), ˆ˜pXit (s′, s), pˆFit , ˆ˜pFit(s), rˆit, wˆit} that satisfy Equations (B20)-(B38). Reflect-
ing Walras Law, one price change should be normalized to 1 and a corresponding
equilibrium condition should be dropped in solving for the equilibrium.9
B.3 Computing Trade Frictions and Expenditure Weights
Using the equilibrium conditions above, along with data on prices {pˆVit (s), pˆFit} and expen-
diture shares {pˆiVit (s), pˆiXit (s′, s), pˆiXjit(s′, s), pˆiFit (s), pˆiFjit(s)}, we solve for Ωˆ in the following se-
quence:
1. We use Equation (B20) to solve for gross output prices pˆit(s).
2. We use Equation (B22) to solve for input trade frictions ωˆXjit(s
′, s).
9Because we focus on nominal values for value-added and gross trade, all results in the paper can be
interpreted without needing to know the country/sector of normalization.
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3. We use Equation (B28) to construct input prices pˆXit (s
′, s).
4. We use Equation (B21) to solve for input expenditure weights ωˆXit (s
′, s).
5. We use Equation (B26) to solve for final goods trade frictions ωˆFjit(s).
6. We use Equation (B31) to construct final goods prices pˆFit(s).
7. We use Equation (B25) to solve for final expenditure weights ωˆFit (s).
B.4 Parameters and Exogenous Variables for Counterfactuals
In addition to Ωˆ, we need values for the remaining exogenous variables {Tˆit, Zˆit(s), Lˆit, sˆit}
to compute counterfactuals. We also need depreciation rates {δit} to track the capital stock
over time. We set {Tˆit} equal to trade balances observed in our global input-output data,
described in Section 1.2. The remaining data are based on the Penn World Tables (Version
8.1).10 We set {Lˆit} equal to changes in “effective labor,” defined as the product of human
capital per worker (the PWT human capital index) times the number of workers (number of
persons engaged).
Turning to capital accumulation, we use the Penn World Tables capital stock series and
country-specific, time-varying depreciation rates δit to back out changes in real investment
Iˆit using Equation (B37).
11 Combined with data on real expenditure, we then compute
sˆit =
Iˆit
Fˆit
.
Lastly, we need to estimate productivity changes Zˆit(s) to conduct counterfactuals. To
do so, we allocate changes in aggregate capital and labor series from the Penn World Tables
using the model. Using Equations (B4) and (B5), it is straightforward to show that Kit(s) =(
GDPit(s)
GDPit
)
Kit and Lit(s) =
(
GDPit(s)
GDPit
)
Lit, where GDPit(s) = p
V
it (s)Vit(s). This gives us data
series for changes in capital and labor by sector {Kˆit(s), Lˆit(s)}. Combining these with data
on real GDP changes Vˆit(s), we recover Zˆit(s) =
Vˆit(s)
(Kˆit(s))α(Lˆit(s))1−α
.
B.5 Additional Details
In computing trade frictions, expenditure weights, and counterfactuals, we confront a few
additional complications.
10See http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.1.
11Because the Penn World Tables capital stock series is built using an investment-specific deflator, this
real investment series allows for investment-specific technical change, which is embedded in sˆit. In making
the assumption that sˆit is exogenous, we are making two underlying assumptions: both the nominal share
of investment in final expenditure and the rate of investment-specific technical are exogenous. This is
substantively the same as in Levchenko and Zhang (2016). While Levchenko and Zhang take the (nominal)
savings rate as exogenous, this is equivalent to taking the nominal investment share as given since their
baseline model has balanced trade. They also use the Penn World Tables capital stock to compute real
investment, as we do.
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Rest of the World As noted in Section 1.2, we possess input-output data for 42 individual
countries and collect remaining countries in a composite rest-of-the-world region. In the
model accounting exercise, we focus on the 37 countries that have complete time series data
from 1970-2009, and add the remaining 5 Eastern European countries to the rest-of-the-world
composite. Because we do not have input-output and price data for this rest-of-the-world
composite, we need to make two additional assumptions.
First, we assume that changes in gross exports from each country to the rest of the world
(ÊX i,ROW,t(s)) are exogenous. This means that the gross output market clearing condition
can be re-written as:
pit(s)Qit(s)pˆit(s)Qˆit(s) =
∑
j 6=ROW
piFijt(s)pi
F
jt(s)p
F
jtFjtpˆi
F
ijt(s)pˆi
F
jt(s)pˆ
F
jtFˆjt
+
∑
s′
∑
j 6=ROW
piXijt(s, s
′)piXjt (s, s
′)pit(s′)Qit(s′)pˆiXijt(s, s
′)pˆiXjt (s, s
′)pˆjt(s′)Qˆjt(s′)
+ EXi,ROW,t(s)ÊX i,ROW,t(s),
where EXi,ROW,t(s) is exports from i to the rest-of-the-world region in sector s. This replaces
Equation (B32) in the numerical solution procedure.
Second, we assume that gross output prices for imports from the rest of the world
(pˆROW,t(s)) are exogenous. Normalizing pˆROW,t(s) = 1, this second assumption implies that
trade frictions {τˆXROW,it(s, s′), τˆFROW,it(s)} measure both changes in frictions and unobserved
price changes.
In all simulations, we feed realized values for ÊX i,ROW,t(s) and {τˆXROW,it(s, s′), τˆFROW,it(s)}
into the model. Therefore, these nuisance parameters do not play a significant role in ex-
plaining differences in simulated data across alternative counterfactual scenarios.
Zeros In the input-output and trade data, there are a small number of zero entries (or
near zeros), almost exclusively in the bilateral trade data and mostly concentrated in first
half of the sample period. These create technical problems in computing trade frictions and
solving the model. If a particular value is zero in the initial period, then xˆt is undefined.
Alternatively, if a particular value is positive in the initial period and then zero in period
t + 1, CES preferences imply that trade frictions fall from infinity to a finite value. Since
these occurrences are rare, we deal with them by adopting an approximation. We take any
value in the bilateral final and and intermediate goods shipments data that is less than
$1000 and set it equal to $1000, and then recompute other objects in the data (e.g., gross
output) as necessary to satisfy adding up conditions. This approximation plays no role in
understanding model results.
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C Model Accounting Appendix
This appendix documents how trade frictions and expenditure weights change over time. It
also describes how we estimate the response of trade frictions to adoption of regional trade
agreements and construct the counterfactual trade cost series used in Section 4.2.
C.1 Changes in Trade Frictions
In our framework, changes in trade frictions vary across bilateral pairs at the sector (or
sector-pair) level. To summarize them, we aggregate the frictions in to composite indexes.
These indexes can be constructed for any time horizon. In our analysis below, we focus on
long horizon changes in trade frictions, from 1970 to 2009.12 Therefore, the hat-notation in
this section can be interpreted as denoting the ratio of frictions in 2009 relative to 1970, and
trade weights are based on 1970 values.
For each importer and sector, we aggregate bilateral frictions via CES indexes:
ωˆF(−i)i(s) ≡
[∑
j 6=i
(
piFji(s)
piF(−i)i(s)
)
ωˆFji(s)
κ/(κ−1)
](κ−1)/κ
(C1)
ωˆX−(i)i(s
′, s) ≡
[∑
j 6=i
(
piXji (s
′, s)
piX(−i)i(s
′, s)
)(
ωˆXji (s
′, s)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
, (C2)
where piF(−i)i(s) =
∑
j 6=i pi
F
ji(s) and pi
X
(−i)i(s
′, s) =
∑
j 6=i pi
X
ji (s
′, s). These indexes aggregate the
trade frictions in a way that summarizes their impact on CES import price indexes.13
To build country-level indexes, we take imported-weighted averages of these indexes
across sectors:
ωˆ(−i)i ≡
∑
s
∑
j 6=i
wFi (s)ωˆ
F
(−i)i(s) +
∑
s
∑
s′
∑
j 6=i
wXi (s
′, s)ωˆX−(i)i(s
′, s),
where the weights are wFi (s) ≡
piFji(s)pi
F
i (s)p
F
i Fi
IMi
and wXi (s
′, s) ≡ piXji (s,s′)piXi (s,s′)pi(s′)Qi(s′)
IMi
, with
IMi =
∑
j 6=i pi
F
ji(s)pi
F
i (s)p
F
i Fit +
∑
s′
∑
j 6=i pi
X
ji (s, s
′)piXi (s, s
′)pi(s′)Qi(s′).
To aggregate trade frictions across countries, we take trade-weighted averages of these
country-level indexes:
ωˆ ≡
∑
i
(
IMit
IMt
)
ωˆ(−i)i. (C3)
For the world as a whole, our estimates imply that iceberg frictions fall by 35% from
1970 to 2009 (i.e., ωˆ = 0.65). To benchmark this figure, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2011)
12Note that 2009 includes the Great Recession and Trade Collapse. Excluding the trade collapse has little
effect on measured trade frictions, consistent with Eaton et al. (forthcoming).
13To clarify this point, one can use the final goods price index (Equation (B31)) to define the following
import price index: pˆF(−i)it(s) ≡
[∑
j 6=i
(
piFjit(s)
piF
(−i)it(s)
)(
ωˆFji(s)pˆj(s)
)κ/(κ−1)](κ−1)/κ
. A price index for imported
inputs can be defined similarly. The trade frictions indexes are analogs to these import price indexes.
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estimate that the ad valorem tariff equivalent of iceberg trade frictions declined by 26% from
1970 to 2000 for 12 industrial countries.14 For reasonable values of iceberg costs in 1970,
this translates into a decline in iceberg frictions on the order of 17%.15 For comparison, our
estimates imply that iceberg frictions fell by 23% over the 1970-2000 interval, close to the
Jacks et al. estimate.16 Comparing this to our estimate over the entire 1970-2008 interval,
iceberg trade costs continued to fall (rapidly) during the 2000’s.
Disaggregating this global result, we present disaggregated trade friction indexes by coun-
try and sector in Table C1. There is significant dispersion in estimated trade cost declines
across countries. The summary statistic ωˆ(−i)i is included in the last column of Table C1.
The quartiles of the distribution are {0.51, 0.64, 0.79}. An important feature of these changes
is that they line up with changes in openness in a sensible way. To illustrate this, Figure C1
plots the log ratio of trade frictions against the log ratio of openness. Turning to the sector
level indexes ωˆF(−i)i(s) and ωˆ
X
−(i)i(s
′, s) in the body of the table, trade frictions decline in 184
out of 222 (83%) of cases. Looking at the medians in the bottom row, declines are somewhat
larger for manufactures (sector 2) than for non-manufactures (sector 1), particularly for final
goods.
C.2 Changes in Expenditure Weights
Table C2 presents changes in input and final goods expenditure weights over time. These
are the cumulated values of ωˆFi (s) and ωˆ
X
i (s
′, s) from 1970-2008.17
Three general points are worth making. First, the changes in final goods expenditure
weights are broadly similar across sectors. This holds despite the fact that the share of
services in final expenditure is rising. The reason is that this rise in the services share is
largely accounted for in the model by the complementarity between manufactures and non-
14In the main body of the paper, Jacks et al. use country-level GDP data to measure production (and
hence domestic trade). In Appendix B of their paper, they use data on gross output for goods producing
sectors instead. Our approach to measuring frictions is closer to this second gross output method, and so
we use it as our benchmark.
15Let τ = (1 + t) be the iceberg friction and let t is the ad valorem tariff equivalent. Jacks et al. report
t2000
t1970
= 0.74. To compare this to our figure, we need to convert this into a ratio of iceberg frictions: 1+t20001+t1970 .
This requires taking a stand on the level of trade frictions in 1970. A reasonable guess is that trade frictions
were 200% in 1970, since Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report ad valorem trade costs totaled 170%
based on evidence from the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Given this prior, then the Jacks et al. tariff equivalent
estimates implies that the ratio of iceberg frictions in 2000 relative to 1970 would be 0.83.
16There are many technical reasons why the estimates should not match exactly, and it is not the purpose
of this paper to conduct a fine-grained comparison of them. Nonetheless, it is useful to highlight a few basic
issues. First, we use a lower trade elasticity than do Jacks et al. (4 versus 8). Second, our sample includes
emerging markets, where declines in frictions have been larger. Both these tend to raise our estimates relative
to Jacks et al. On the other hand, we include services trade, where the Jacks et al. estimate covers goods
trade only. This tends to attenuate measured changes in aggregate trade frictions, since frictions in services
have fallen more slowly than in manufactures (see Table C1). All together, we conclude that our estimates
are in the ballpark of what is currently known about changes in trade costs.
17Here we exclude data for 2009, during the Great Recession and Trade Collapse. The reason is that
there are sharp changes in demand composition during the recession, which are picked up in the measured
expenditure weights. For example, the final expenditure weight on manufacturing is substantially lower in
2009, reflecting the collapse in demand for manufactures (despite minimal price changes) observed in the
data. Discarding these recession-induced changes gives us a clearer picture of secular trends.
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manufactures in preferences. Second, on the input side, increases in expenditure weights
for the use of non-manufactures as inputs have tended to pull input expenditure toward
non-manufactures over time. This reflects structural change in IO tables, not accounted for
by relative price changes. In contrast, manufactures have become more intensively used in
services (indicated in the 2,1 column) for reasons not accounted for by relative prices. Third,
at the individual and country and sector level, there is a good bit of heterogeneity in how
these expenditure weights evolve. We implicitly assess whether these structural shifts and
heterogeneity matter via the counterfactuals.
C.3 Trade Frictions and RTA Adoption
To estimate how trade frictions change with RTA adoption, we model the trade frictions in
levels as:
ωXijt(s, s
′) = ΦXij (s, s
′)ΦXit (s, s
′)ΦXjt(s, s
′)cXijt(s, s
′),
ωFijt(s) = Φ
F
ij(s)Φ
F
it(s)Φ
F
jt(s)c
F
ijt(s),
(C4)
where the first component is a time-invariant pair effect, the second and third components
are source and destination time-varying effects, and the fourth component is a bilateral,
time-varying effect. We then parameterize the bilateral, time-varying component as:
log(cXijt(s, s
′)) = βX(s, s′)TradeAgreementijt + Xijt(s, s
′),
log(cFijt(s)) = β
F (s)TradeAgreementijt + 
F
ijt(s),
(C5)
where TradeAgreementijt is a vector of indicators for whether i and j are in a particular
trade agreement at time t, and βX(s, s′) and βF (s) are then estimated trade agreement
effects for each type of trade and sector-pairing.
Taking logs and first-differences across adjacent time periods (five year intervals), we
arrive at the following reduced form estimating equations:
∆log(ωXijt(s, s
′))=∆φXit (s, s
′)+∆φXjt(s, s
′)+βX(s, s′)∆TradeAgreementijt+∆Xijt(s, s
′),
∆ log(ωFijt(s))=∆φ
F
it(s)+∆φ
F
jt(s)+β
F (s)∆TradeAgreementijt+∆
F
ijt(s),
(C6)
where φ ≡ log(Φ). Note that the time-invariant, pair-specific components of the trade
frictions are differenced away. Further, we can control for the time-varying source and
destination components of trade costs with source-year and destination-year fixed effects.
Following the discussion in Section 2.2, we estimate these regressions using several alter-
native specifications for TradeAgreementijt. We report coefficient estimates for the same
specifications used in Figure C6.
Using the point estimates on trade agreement indicators from estimating Equation (C6),
we adjust measured trade frictions ωˆXijt(s, s
′) and ωˆFijt(s) to remove changes due to adoption
of trade agreements. The exact procedure we use is as follows.
We first cumulate changes in the trade frictions to define a series that defines changes
since 1970. Let υˆXijt(s, s
′) ≡ ωXijt(s, s′)/ωXij1970(s, s′) and υˆFijt(s) ≡ ωFijt(s)/ωFij1970(s) denote the
ratio of trade frictions in year t relative to 1970. Then we compute bilateral adjustment
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factors exp
(
βX(s, s′)∆1970TradeAgreementijt
)
and exp
(
βF (s)∆1970TradeAgreementijt
)
,
where ∆1970 indicates a long difference from year t to 1970. These adjustment factors
take the value one in years that a pair has the same agreement it had in 1970 (i.e., when
∆1970TradeAgreementijt = 0). They take on the values exp
(
βX(s, s′)
)
or exp
(
βF (s)
)
when
ij has an agreement in year t that it did not have in 1970.18 The counterfactual changes in
trade frictions are then given by:
ˆ˜υXijt(s, s
′) ≡ υˆ
X
ijt(s, s
′)
exp (βX(s, s′)∆1970TradeAgreementijt)
,
ˆ˜υFijt(s) ≡
υˆFijt(s)
exp (βF (s)∆1970TradeAgreementijt)
,
(C7)
where the tilde denotes counterfactual values. Since the estimates of βX(s, s′) and βF (s)
are negative in all cases, this adjustment raises counterfactual trade frictions relative to
the baseline series. We convert these counterfactual cumulative changes in trade frictions
into counterfactual year-on-year changes by taking ratios of cumulative changes in adjacent
years: ˆ˜ωXijt(s, s
′) ≡ ˆ˜υXij,t+1(s, s′)/ˆ˜υXijt(s, s′) and ˆ˜ωFijt(s) ≡ ˆ˜υFij,t+1(s)/ˆ˜υFijt(s). We feed ˆ˜ωXijt(s, s′)
and ˆ˜ωFijt(s) into the model to generate the counterfactuals in Section 4.2.
18In this adjustment, we use the same set of trade agreement indicators as we use in running the regression,
with changes in agreement status recorded at 5 year intervals.
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Table C1: Changes in Trade Frictions
Final Goods Inputs Trade-Weighted
n m n,n n,m m,n m,m Average
ARG 0.31 0.22 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.27 0.28
AUS 0.88 0.59 0.90 0.65 0.73 0.87 0.76
AUT 1.06 0.50 0.96 1.00 0.70 0.58 0.69
BEL 0.56 0.36 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.52
BRA 0.98 1.30 0.89 1.19 1.51 1.29 1.23
CAN 0.55 0.60 0.70 0.55 0.81 0.81 0.69
CHE 0.97 0.96 0.93 1.04 1.16 1.18 1.05
CHL 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.36 0.55 0.68 0.52
CHN 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.20
DEU 0.47 0.55 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.62
DNK 0.58 0.44 1.16 1.47 0.78 0.76 0.82
ESP 1.08 0.62 1.19 1.17 1.02 0.82 0.91
FIN 1.18 0.36 0.81 0.72 0.40 0.41 0.53
FRA 0.64 0.51 0.87 0.88 0.69 0.72 0.69
GBR 0.61 0.26 1.34 1.31 0.23 0.31 0.64
GRC 0.61 0.48 0.37 0.59 0.58 0.51 0.52
HUN 0.58 0.44 0.52 0.36 0.68 0.68 0.59
IDN 1.28 0.32 1.29 1.02 0.35 0.46 0.58
IND 0.03 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.24
IRL 2.05 0.48 1.39 0.67 1.01 1.01 0.94
ISR 0.62 0.40 0.57 0.62 0.39 0.46 0.49
ITA 0.69 0.52 1.09 1.23 0.97 0.67 0.83
JPN 0.76 0.43 1.31 1.32 0.52 0.59 0.97
KOR 0.96 0.25 1.32 1.67 0.39 0.40 0.78
MEX 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.59 0.72 0.63 0.63
NLD 1.42 0.00 1.15 1.79 0.65 1.09 0.87
NOR 0.63 1.05 0.84 1.02 1.19 1.09 1.01
NZL 0.85 0.55 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.85 0.73
POL 0.31 0.10 0.44 0.47 0.15 0.12 0.21
PRT 0.70 0.66 0.84 0.73 0.95 0.86 0.78
ROU 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.24 0.01 0.21
SWE 0.39 0.33 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.37 0.38
THA 0.26 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.88 0.60 0.64
TUR 0.40 0.47 0.50 0.73 0.59 0.64 0.57
USA 0.70 0.31 0.47 0.55 0.31 0.34 0.42
VNM 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.48 0.40
ZAF 0.75 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.86 0.79
Median 0.63 0.47 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.63
Note: Trade frictions indexes cumulated values of ωˆF(−i)i(s) and ωˆ
X
−(i)i(s
′, s) for 1970-2009. The last column
includes a trade-weighted average of frictions for each importing country, defined by ωˆi in the text. In column
labels, the pair (s’,s) denotes shipments from sector s’ to sector s. Sector abbreviations are manufacturing
(m) and non-manufacturing (n).
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Table C2: Changes in Expenditure Weights
Final Goods Inputs
n m n,n n,m m,n m,m
ARG 1.16 0.62 1.28 2.91 0.44 0.90
AUS 0.87 0.35 1.97 2.51 0.49 0.57
AUT 0.92 1.16 2.03 1.75 0.45 1.41
BEL 0.94 1.74 1.52 3.57 0.15 1.37
BRA 1.42 0.53 1.28 3.28 0.46 0.76
CAN 0.96 0.54 1.08 1.35 0.58 1.46
CHE 0.86 1.09 1.11 1.39 0.66 1.09
CHL 0.76 0.99 1.53 2.17 0.48 1.44
CHN 0.60 0.62 2.52 0.75 2.48 1.47
DEU 1.25 0.46 2.25 2.01 0.21 1.11
DNK 0.78 0.92 3.62 0.75 0.41 1.08
ESP 0.95 0.49 2.16 1.30 0.54 1.10
FIN 0.78 2.28 1.88 1.00 1.20 0.68
FRA 1.05 0.33 2.05 1.62 0.49 1.32
GBR 0.96 0.54 4.90 0.92 0.57 0.66
GRC 1.29 1.08 1.41 1.40 0.69 0.95
HUN 1.28 1.41 1.51 1.71 0.38 2.13
IDN 0.43 2.52 3.88 0.07 29.53 1.95
IND 0.67 0.96 1.42 1.14 3.36 1.32
IRL 0.62 1.05 2.19 1.13 2.00 0.40
ISR 1.16 0.72 1.62 1.59 0.32 0.76
ITA 0.93 0.60 2.21 0.98 0.80 1.25
JPN 1.47 0.58 1.57 0.91 0.55 0.81
KOR 0.69 1.88 2.99 0.11 7.33 1.49
MEX 0.99 0.94 1.13 0.95 1.04 2.60
NLD 0.67 2.11 5.00 1.43 0.29 1.42
NOR 1.22 0.41 1.06 1.96 0.22 0.93
NZL 0.99 1.07 1.38 0.99 0.51 0.93
POL 1.15 1.99 1.06 0.57 0.94 1.40
PRT 0.91 0.54 1.83 1.15 0.44 1.38
ROU 1.32 0.44 1.43 4.60 0.36 1.13
SWE 0.97 1.58 1.40 1.89 0.69 0.98
THA 0.68 2.09 1.54 0.55 1.31 3.10
TUR 0.65 0.88 1.76 1.18 1.04 2.79
USA 0.84 0.55 1.93 1.32 1.29 0.76
VNM 0.61 1.92 0.62 0.68 3.91 1.74
ZAF 0.78 0.50 1.83 1.83 0.67 0.90
Median 0.93 0.92 1.62 1.32 0.57 1.13
Note: Expenditure weights are cumulated values for ωˆFi (s) and ωˆ
X
i (s
′, s) for 1970-2008. In column labels,
the pair (s’,s) denotes shipments from sector s’ to sector s. Sector abbreviations are manufacturing (m) and
non-manufacturing (n).
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Table C3: Panel Regressions of Changes in Trade Frictions with Regional Trade Agreements
Panel A: Binary RTA Variable
Inputs Final Goods
n,n n,m m,n m,m n m
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
RTA -0.070*** -0.041* -0.081*** -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.076***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
R2 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.53
Panel B: By Agreement Type
Inputs Final Goods
n,n n,m m,n m,m n m
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
PTA -0.046* -0.017 -0.053* -0.064** -0.042 -0.117***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038)
FTA -0.072*** -0.034 -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.086*** -0.111***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031)
CUCMEU -0.226*** -0.173*** -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.260*** -0.189***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034)
R2 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.53
Panel C: With Phase-in Effects
Inputs Final Goods
n,n n,m m,n m,m n m
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6)
RTA(1) -0.080*** -0.049** -0.087*** -0.079*** -0.091*** -0.077***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
RTA(2) -0.147*** -0.101*** -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.095*** -0.064**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027)
RTA(3) -0.167*** -0.127*** -0.148*** -0.142*** -0.154*** -0.100***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032)
RTA(4) -0.217*** -0.163*** -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.178*** -0.101***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.037)
R2 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.53
Note: In column labels, the ordered pair (s’,s) denotes shipments from sector s’ to sector s. Sector abbrevi-
ations are manufacturing (m) and non-manufacturing (n). All regressions are estimated in first differences,
with exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects (pair fixed effects are implicitly differenced away). There
are 10,656 observations in each regression. Standard errors, clustered by country pair, are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < .1 , ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Figure C1: Changes in Trade Frictions and Openness, by Country
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D Supplemental Results Appendix
This appendix includes supplemental data and decomposition results, which we omitted from
the main set of figures for brevity.
Table D1 includes data by sector for the world as a whole, along with the share of each
sector in world trade. These are the data plotted in Figures 1 and 2. Table D2 includes data
by country, in the aggregate and by composite sector. These are the country-level ratios
plotted in Figure 3.
In Section 4, we mentioned that trade composition plays a large role in explaining differ-
ential changes in value-added to export ratios across countries. We document that assertion
here via a Between-Within decomposition. Letting V AXit and V AXit(s) denote aggregate
and sector-level value-added to export ratios for country i, then we construct the decompo-
sition as follows:
∆V AXit =
∑
s
ω¯it(s)∆V AXit(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Withini
+ +
∑
s
V AX it(s)∆ωit(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Betweeni
, (D1)
where ω¯it(s) ≡ ωit(s)+ωi,t−1(s)2 with ωit(s) =
∑
j 6=i xijt(s)∑
j 6=i
∑
s xijt(s)
, and V AX it(s) ≡ V AXit(s)+V AXi,t−1(s)2 .
To reiterate, the between term is driven by changes in trade shares for a given country, while
the within term is driven by changes in value-added to export ratios within sectors in that
country.
Results for this decomposition are presented in the last two columns of Table D2. We
also include data on changes in the share of manufacturing of exports in the table. The
takeaway is that is that changes in the composition of trade are important determinants of
difference in the magnitude of value-added to export ratio changes across countries. Broadly,
the share of manufactures in trade increases in non-commodity exporter emerging markets.
Since the value-added to export ratio is lower for manufacturing than non-manufacturing,
an increase in the share of manufacturing in trade mechanically lowers the aggregate VAX
ratio. Interesting, the within term is actually positive in many countries, where increases in
the value-added to export ratio in non-manufacturing dominate declines in manufacturing
(this can occur either due to the magnitude of the VAX changes themselves, or because
non-manufacturing has a large weight in exports).
In Figure D1, we project the components of this Between-Within decomposition on in-
come growth, similar to Panel (b) of Figure 3. The within term tends to be positively
correlated with income growth, while the between term tends to be negatively correlated
with income growth. As such, the fact that growth predicts declines in the overall value-
added to export ratio is entirely due to the between term. That is, fast growing countries
tend to see the share of manufacturing in their exports rise, and this drives the overall
correlation between declining VAX ratios and growth at the country level.
In Section 2.2, we discussed how bilateral value-added to gross export ratios respond to
distance, and how this response has changed over time. Here we document this result in
a complementary way, which allows us to discuss the role of additional gravity proxies for
trade costs as well. Building on Equation (3), we estimate a gravity-type equation in long
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differences:
∆ log(yijt) = ∆φ
y
it + ∆φ
y
jt + β˘
y
t log(distij) + γ˘
y
tGravProxyij + ∆η
y
ijt, (D2)
where t = {1975, 2005} and β˘yt ≡ ∆β˜yt is an estimate of the change in regression coefficients
over time.19 While log(distij) is bilateral distance (as in the main text), GravProxyij is a
stand-in variable for conventional gravity proxies included in the regression, with associated
change in the gravity coefficient given by γ˘yt . We examine three commonly used trade cost
proxies to the regression – common language, common borders (contiguity), and common
colonial origin.20
In Table D3, the estimates in Column (1) of Panel A indicate that declines in the ratio
of value-added to gross exports are smaller for countries that are farther apart. Looking
at gross and value-added exports separately, changes in both gross and value-added trade
are smaller for countries that are far apart, but distance increasingly dampens gross exports
more than value-added exports. These results confirm the results plotted in Figure 4.
In contrast to distance, we see that gross and value-added exports respond similarly to
other gravity proxies for trade costs in columns (2)-(5) of Table D3. Common borders,
common language and colonial origin are associated with smaller changes in both gross and
value-added trade, with roughly similar magnitudes. As a result, there is no change in the
correlation of value-added to export ratios with these variables over time. Moreover, adding
these additional explanatory variables does not change the magnitude of the differential
responses of gross and value-added trade to distance. In sum, distance stands out in terms
of its explanatory power.
19Note that by estimating the gravity equation in first differences, we are implicitly including a pair-specific
fixed effect that is differenced away. This controls for all omitted, bilateral, time-invariant variables.
20This data is also taken from the CEPII Gravity Dataset. The contiguity indicator takes the value one if
the two countries share a land border. The common colonial origin indicator takes the value one if the two
countries were ever in a colonial relationship. The common language indicator takes the value one if the two
countries share a common official language.
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Table D1: World Value Added to Export Ratio and Components
Agriculture Non-Manufacturing Manufacturing Services
Year VAX Ratio Trade Share VAX Ratio Trade Share VAX Ratio Trade Share VAX Ratio Trade Share Agg. VAX Ratio
1970 1.19 0.09 1.10 0.07 0.65 0.64 1.36 0.21 0.87
1971 1.21 0.09 1.10 0.07 0.64 0.64 1.36 0.21 0.87
1972 1.20 0.09 1.12 0.07 0.64 0.64 1.39 0.20 0.87
1973 1.18 0.09 1.11 0.07 0.63 0.64 1.38 0.20 0.87
1974 1.15 0.08 1.00 0.12 0.61 0.62 1.38 0.18 0.84
1975 1.16 0.08 1.01 0.12 0.61 0.61 1.40 0.19 0.85
1976 1.14 0.08 1.01 0.12 0.61 0.61 1.40 0.19 0.85
1977 1.16 0.08 1.01 0.12 0.61 0.61 1.40 0.19 0.85
1978 1.15 0.08 1.04 0.10 0.61 0.63 1.42 0.19 0.85
1979 1.15 0.07 1.02 0.12 0.60 0.62 1.42 0.19 0.84
1980 1.11 0.06 0.99 0.15 0.59 0.61 1.42 0.18 0.83
1981 1.12 0.06 0.98 0.15 0.59 0.60 1.43 0.19 0.84
1982 1.14 0.06 0.98 0.14 0.59 0.61 1.44 0.19 0.84
1983 1.12 0.06 1.02 0.11 0.59 0.63 1.47 0.19 0.84
1984 1.13 0.06 0.97 0.12 0.59 0.63 1.48 0.19 0.83
1985 1.15 0.06 0.98 0.12 0.59 0.64 1.49 0.19 0.84
1986 1.22 0.05 1.07 0.08 0.60 0.67 1.52 0.19 0.85
1987 1.22 0.05 1.10 0.07 0.60 0.68 1.53 0.20 0.85
1988 1.22 0.05 1.14 0.06 0.60 0.69 1.55 0.20 0.85
1989 1.26 0.05 1.11 0.07 0.59 0.69 1.54 0.20 0.84
1990 1.33 0.04 1.05 0.07 0.59 0.68 1.52 0.20 0.85
1991 1.30 0.04 1.09 0.08 0.56 0.67 1.58 0.21 0.84
1992 1.30 0.04 0.93 0.08 0.55 0.66 1.58 0.21 0.83
1993 1.34 0.04 1.12 0.07 0.55 0.68 1.57 0.22 0.84
1994 1.34 0.04 1.18 0.06 0.54 0.69 1.58 0.21 0.83
1995 1.32 0.04 1.18 0.06 0.54 0.70 1.61 0.20 0.82
1996 1.32 0.04 1.14 0.06 0.53 0.69 1.60 0.20 0.82
1997 1.33 0.04 1.13 0.06 0.52 0.70 1.61 0.20 0.81
1998 1.36 0.03 1.29 0.05 0.52 0.71 1.61 0.21 0.81
1999 1.33 0.03 1.23 0.05 0.51 0.71 1.62 0.21 0.80
2000 1.35 0.03 1.09 0.07 0.50 0.70 1.61 0.20 0.79
2001 1.38 0.03 1.15 0.07 0.50 0.70 1.62 0.20 0.79
2002 1.39 0.03 1.18 0.06 0.50 0.70 1.63 0.21 0.80
2003 1.40 0.03 1.15 0.07 0.49 0.70 1.64 0.20 0.80
2004 1.47 0.03 1.13 0.07 0.49 0.70 1.62 0.20 0.79
2005 1.44 0.03 1.08 0.09 0.48 0.69 1.61 0.20 0.78
2006 1.42 0.02 1.08 0.10 0.47 0.69 1.61 0.19 0.77
2007 1.42 0.03 1.08 0.09 0.47 0.69 1.59 0.20 0.77
2008 1.36 0.03 1.01 0.12 0.46 0.66 1.57 0.19 0.76
2009 1.32 0.03 1.08 0.09 0.47 0.66 1.57 0.21 0.79
Note: Data includes trade with the rest-of-the-world. Column 10 can be constructed as an export share
weighted average of columns 2 through 9.
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Table D2: Changes in Value Added to Export Ratio and Components, by Country
VAX Changes Decomposition
Country Abbrev. Years Aggregate Non-Manuf. Manuf. ∆ Manuf. Share Within Between
Argentina ARG 1970-2009 -0.06 0.42 -0.30 0.12 0.02 -0.08
Australia AUS 1970-2009 -0.04 0.00 -0.22 -0.09 -0.10 0.05
Austria AUT 1970-2009 -0.13 0.14 -0.23 0.03 -0.10 -0.03
Belgium BEL 1970-2009 -0.10 0.21 -0.28 -0.05 -0.15 0.05
Brazil BRA 1970-2009 -0.06 0.41 -0.37 0.24 -0.05 -0.01
Canada CAN 1970-2009 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 -0.13 0.03
Chile CHL 1970-2009 -0.10 -0.56 -0.11 -0.16 -0.25 0.15
China CHN 1970-2009 -0.16 1.93 -0.19 0.32 0.23 -0.40
Czech Republic CZE 1993-2009 -0.05 0.44 -0.04 0.12 0.06 -0.12
Denmark DNK 1970-2009 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.04
Estonia EST 1993-2009 0.04 0.30 -0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.03
Finland FIN 1970-2009 -0.06 -0.40 -0.10 -0.11 -0.18 0.12
France FRA 1970-2009 -0.10 0.43 -0.21 0.07 -0.02 -0.08
Germany DEU 1970-2009 -0.13 0.04 -0.22 -0.03 -0.18 0.05
Greece GRC 1970-2009 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.07 0.00
Hungary HUN 1970-2009 -0.23 -0.03 -0.22 0.05 -0.21 -0.02
India IND 1970-2009 -0.17 -0.11 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 -0.06
Indonesia IDN 1970-2009 -0.07 0.22 0.15 0.42 0.13 -0.21
Ireland IRL 1970-2009 -0.19 -0.47 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06
Israel ISR 1970-2009 -0.04 0.47 -0.28 0.36 0.12 -0.16
Italy ITA 1970-2009 -0.08 0.55 -0.16 0.07 0.00 -0.08
Japan JPN 1970-2009 -0.03 -0.30 -0.07 -0.05 -0.12 0.09
Korea KOR 1970-2009 -0.14 0.44 0.03 0.19 0.13 -0.28
Mexico MEX 1970-2009 -0.21 0.81 -0.18 0.41 0.17 -0.38
Netherlands NLD 1970-2009 -0.08 0.32 -0.21 0.02 -0.06 -0.03
New Zealand NZL 1970-2009 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.03
Norway NOR 1970-2009 0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.26 -0.06 0.15
Poland POL 1970-2009 -0.09 0.93 -0.23 0.14 0.11 -0.20
Portugal PRT 1970-2009 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.01
Romania ROM 1970-2009 -0.22 0.40 -0.37 0.06 -0.25 0.02
Russia RUS 1990-2009 -0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
Slovak Republic SVK 1993-2009 -0.11 0.83 -0.06 0.17 0.09 -0.21
Slovenia SVN 1993-2009 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 0.02
South Africa ZAF 1970-2009 -0.06 0.48 -0.19 0.18 0.10 -0.15
Spain ESP 1970-2009 -0.13 0.27 -0.31 0.17 -0.04 -0.09
Sweden SWE 1970-2009 -0.10 -0.15 -0.22 -0.09 -0.22 0.11
Switzerland CHE 1970-2009 -0.03 -0.42 -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 0.13
Thailand THA 1970-2009 -0.21 0.59 -0.07 0.43 0.14 -0.34
Turkey TUR 1970-2009 -0.18 0.77 -0.55 0.57 0.09 -0.28
United Kingdom GBR 1970-2009 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.12 -0.14 0.11
United States USA 1970-2009 -0.09 0.07 -0.20 -0.01 -0.11 0.02
Vietnam VNM 1970-2009 -0.22 0.08 -0.14 0.28 -0.06 -0.16
Note: VAX changes are cumulative changes in value added to export ratios over the period recorded in
column 3. ∆ Manuf. Share is the change in the manufacturing share of total exports over the period.
The Between and Within columns decompose the overall VAX change into between-sector and within-sector
components. See the text for the exact definition.
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Table D3: Long Difference Panel Regressions with Proxies for Trade Costs
Panel A: Change in Log VAX Ratio
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Log Distance 0.095*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.089***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Contiguity -0.046 -0.047
(0.034) (0.036)
Colonial Origin -0.003 0.002
(0.032) (0.038)
Common Language -0.005 0.003
(0.028) (0.033)
R2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Panel B: Change in Log Value-Added Exports
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5)
Log Distance -0.103*** -0.126*** -0.101*** -0.122*** -0.122***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032)
Contiguity -0.180* -0.077
(0.106) (0.110)
Colonial Origin -0.447*** -0.363***
(0.105) (0.122)
Common Language -0.247*** -0.132
(0.071) (0.088)
R2 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67
Panel C: Change in Log Gross Exports
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5)
Log Distance -0.197*** -0.215*** -0.195*** -0.216*** -0.210***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041)
Contiguity -0.134 -0.030
(0.124) (0.128)
Colonial Origin -0.444*** -0.365**
(0.127) (0.148)
Common Language -0.242*** -0.135
(0.089) (0.110)
R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61
Obs. 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171
Note: Changes in log bilateral VAX ratios, log value-added exports, and log gross exports between 2005 and
1975 are regressed on trade cost proxies and exporter and importer fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < .1 , ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Sample excludes pairs with bilateral
exports smaller than $1 million or VAX ratios larger than ten in 1975.
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Figure D1: Between and Within Decomposition of Changes in Value Added to Export Ratios
versus Average Annual Real GDP Per Capita Growth, by Country
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Note: Countries with vertical labels have less than 40 years of data.
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